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Rereading D Hobart Houghton￿ s The South African Economy (1967) and Economic Development
1865-1965 (1971) brings to mind the stark theoretical and empirical di⁄erences between his account
of thirty years ago and current views of economic growth. Hobart Houghton wrote within the
optimistic and conceptually quite simple framework of W W Rostow￿ s ￿ve stages of economic growth
￿only get to ￿ take o⁄￿and your economic future is assured ￿whereas analysis of economic growth
now draws on a more extended and technical literature which comes to no such simple conclusion.
Hobart Houghton was writing after three decades of sustained growth in real per capita income;
since then an extended period of falling real per capita income has inscribed itself on the South
African record (see Figure 1), during a period of political instability and change. Hobart Houghton
wrote in the Bretton Woods world which had gathered to itself a sense of stability: we are more
uncomfortably aware that international trade and ￿nance regimes have changed several times since
the middle of the nineteenth century, usually with sharp and widespread transition costs. And thirty
years ago, comparative information on economic growth was limited to a small (and biased) sample
of countries. As more and more countries are brought within the scope of the World Bank￿ s World
Development Report, for instance;it has become apparent that middle income countries (of which
South Africa is one) can regress economically just as easily as they can progress. Governments and
peoples now understand themselves as engaged in the elusive quest for economic growth.1
These observations are used to structure the exposition in this chapter. First, modern economic
growth theory is delineated in order to de￿ne what is to be looked for in the historical record. Not
all the issues are intuitively obvious, nor are they entirely settled within the economics literature.
Moreover, the recent literature on growth is massive and investigates the impact of a great many
variables on economic growth. Constraints of space and information con￿ne this analysis to the
following core issues:
￿ the determinants of investment and hence of the trajectory of capital accumulation
￿ growth accounting, i.e. the relative contributions of employment, capital stock and technolog-
ical change on growth
￿ the contribution of human capital to growth
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1The title of an in￿uential book by William Easterly (2001).
1￿ the contribution of the ￿nancial sector and foreign capital ￿ ows to growth
￿ monetary and ￿scal policy: the demand side of growth
￿ the impact of governance and institutions on growth
￿ the functioning of the labour market and its impact on growth
Secondly, the international economic environment has in￿ uenced the pattern of South Africa￿ s
economic development, strongly at times, so there is a brief description of the four main interna-
tional trade and ￿nancial regimes under which South African development since 1870 has taken place.
Thirdly, a narrative of the key aspects of the South African growth record is provided, using the
international trade and ￿nancial regime periodisation. Fourthly, there is an examination of econo-
metrically based evidence of the determinants of South African growth since 1945. A conclusion
follows.
There are important omitted issues. One is the relationship between inequality and growth in
South Africa. This is omitted partly because of limited and not very reliable information on South
African inequality and partly because there is no certainty about the relationship between inequality
and growth from theoretical arguments or empirical evidence. The consensus from the empirical work
of the 1990s was that there is a negative relationship between inequality and economic growth, but
a careful recent study has concluded that, in the short and medium term, an increase in a country￿ s
level of inequality has a signi￿cant positive relationship with subsequent growth.2 A second omitted
issue is the relationship between social capital and economic growth. And there are many others.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real per capita GDP (in 1990 prices) and growth in real per
capita GDP between 1925 and 1999. This is much of what we set out to explain.
2 Core developments in the theory of economic growth3
Modern economic growth theory starts with contributions by Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). They
used a ￿xed proportions production function with no possibility of substitution between capital and
labour. Except in a special (￿ knife edge￿ ) case, growth has the consequence of perpetual increases in
either unemployed workers or unemployed machines.
However, the reference point of post-war growth theory is provided by two independent contri-
butions by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), which came to shift the terms of the debate. Whereas
the 1930s posed pressing questions surrounding the possibility of growth and accumulation in the
presence of the unemployment of at least some factors of production, the post-war focus shifted to
the conditions for balanced economic growth, in the presence of full employment of all factors of
production.
The elegant simplicity of the Solow-Swan theory is one explanation for its continuing in￿ uence.
Another is that the model illustrates clearly the three core building blocks of any theory of economic
growth, viz. accumulation of physical capital, employment of labour, and technological progress.
Subsequent contributions to the theory of economic growth can be understood either as variations
on our understanding of these three contributors to economic growth, or as extensions of the growth
framework in order to incorporate additional determinants of economic development.
2.1 Placing investment in physical capital stock centre stage
The departure point of the Solow-Swan model was the observation that a number of core growth
rates and ratios in developed economies remained remarkably constant over long periods of time.
2Forbes (2000): 869
3The discussion that follows draws on a number of sources, notably Fedderke (1997, 2002). The authors thank
Theoria for the permission to use the material for this presentation.
2The proportional growth rates of labour hours and of the capital stock both appeared constant
over the long run. Since the growth rate in capital exceeded that of labour hours by a small
constant magnitude, labour productivity in turn manifested a stable upward trend (subject to cyclical
displacement), while the capital-output ratio and the pro￿t rate remained constant over time.
Such empirical regularities over the sample of developed economies for which data was available
were not compatible with the Harrod-Domar framework. Under the Harrod-Domar conception
of growth the balance between factors of production and output observed by Solow-Swan would
have been achieved by mere chance. The resolution of this apparent puzzle under the Solow-Swan
approach was achieved by the abandonment of the crucial Harrod-Domar assumption that factors of
production could be combined only in ￿xed proportions. Instead, capital and labour were deemed
substitutable under technology that manifested constant returns to scale, and diminishing marginal
returns to all factors of production. Given only a constant exogenously determined growth rate
in the labour force (due to relevant demographic mechanisms, say),4 and savings proportional to
output that are necessarily invested in physical capital stock (due to the presence of a ￿nancial sector
intermediating between savers and investors),5 it then follows that the economy will manifest a steady
state toward which it will necessarily converge. At low levels of physical capital accumulation, a high
marginal productivity of capital creates an incentive to invest, thus raising the capital-labour ratio
and labour productivity. Falling marginal product of capital ensures both a rise in the capital-output
ratio, and a declining incentive to invest, until a point is reached at which the full savings (and hence
investment) generated by the economy are employed simply in order to supply new labour hours
entering the workforce with the same capital intensity as existing previous labour hours available
for production.
In this steady state or equilibrium growth path of the economy the capital-labour ratio and
labour productivity (per capita output) would become constant, and capital, labour and output
would all come to grow at the constant natural growth rate predicted by the growth rate in labour
hours, and the economy would manifest the stylized facts that motivated the Solow-Swan theoretical
departure from Harrod-Domar in the ￿rst instance.
What should be clear is that the long run development of an economy is essentially attributable
to the capital accumulation that is realized. More capital translates into higher labour productivity,
though at a declining rate. Even in the modern growth literature which has come to explore more
diverse drivers of economic growth, there remain strong proponents of the position that investment
in physical capital stock remains the heart of the matter.6
Only three means would enable an economy to alter the Solow-Swan constants of long run
economic development. First, raising the savings rate of the economy would raise the proportion
of output available for capital accumulation, and would enable a higher capital-labour ratio to be
attained, with the attendant realization of a higher per capita output. Second, a lower growth rate
of the labour force would allow the use of investment for the purposes of capital deepening rather
than capital widening, and again the consequence would be a rising capital-labour ratio and higher
4One complication for the theory is that over the course of economic development the growth rate of the labour
force may come to decline. Empirical evidence suggests that the demographic transition is related to the level of per
capital output ￿see for instance Maddison (1987). The implication is that the economy may face multiple equilibrium
growth paths, of which some may constitute low-level equilibrium traps. Full discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of our paper.
5The assumption of a proportional savings rate may appear to imply a crude theory of savings that would carry the
need for strong quali￿cations of the steady state behaviour of the Solow-Swan model. It is possible to show that this
is not the case. Under assumptions of classical savings behaviour such that savings are a function of the pro￿t rate
(see Branson (1989)), or Kaldor (1955-56, 1963) savings under which ￿capitalists￿and ￿workers￿maintain di⁄erential
savings rates, or Ando-Modigliani (1963) life cycle savings behaviour, it is possible to show that the steady state
characteristics of the economy are unchanged except in some extreme (and hence unlikely) instances.
6Good illustrations are provided by De Long and Summers (1991, 1993). Easterly (2001) infers from the Solow-
Swan model that only technological progress is relevant to long run growth. But this is true only if all economies
are in steady state. During the period of transition of an economy to steady state, the rate of capital accumulation
remains important.
3labour productivity.
Both changes in the savings rate and changes in the growth rate of the labour force would only
result in a temporary change in the growth rate of output, as the economy moves to the new steady
state de￿ned by the new savings rate or labour force growth rate. In steady state the natural growth
rate of the economy would again prevail. The only means of permanently accelerating the growth
rate of output under the Solow-Swan model is through technological progress. Where innovation is
consistently able to improve the productivity with which existing capital and labour time is employed
in the generation of output, per capita output is able to grow inde￿nitely also.
2.2 The impact and determinants of technological progress: exogeneity
vs endogeneity
The central role of technological progress in economic growth was recognized both empirically7 and
theoretically8 from the outset in the post-war debate. Early treatment of technological progress
treated the innovation process as exogenous (or at least as beyond the scope of economic analysis),
and focused instead either on the innovation￿ s impact on factor intensity (labour-saving, capital-
saving, or neutral), or on the implications of the embodiment of technological innovation in new
investment instead of the entire stock of capital in the economy.9
Of course, as long as the source of technological progress is treated as exogenous to economic
analysis, there is little to add to it. Such an outcome is vexing particularly where it is found that
innovation is an important contributor to economic growth over and above capital accumulation.
The upshot would be that economics has less to add to our understanding of growth than one might
have thought. The embarrassment is even more acute when one notes that the empirical data that
became available over the post-1960 period on the economic performance of a wide range of newly
independent developing nations appears to point to the importance of technological progress.10 One
response to the embarrassment is to endogenize technological progress, rendering economic theory
more comprehensive.
A large number of contributions to endogenous technological progress have emerged since the
reinvigoration of the growth debate in the mid 1980￿ s. In presenting these contributions we present
a number of classes of models that can serve to structure one￿ s understanding of the endogenous
growth literature. Before doing so, it is useful to bear in mind two quali￿ers. First, the central
idea that underlies all of the endogenous growth literature is fairly straightforward. It rests on
the proposition that technological progress takes place because resources are devoted to it ￿either
intentionally in the case of Schumpeterian approaches, or inadvertently through knowledge spill-over
processes. Second, one should bear in mind that while endogenous technological progress came to
prominence in the 1980￿ s, a number of earlier contributions to the literature on economic growth had
advanced similar propositions, and explored their implications in some detail.11 For a fuller non-
7Abramovitz (1956) famously established that employing the growth accounting framework implied by Solow-Swan,
would leave approximately 75% of output growth unaccounted for by factor accumulation, and hence by implication
due to technological progress. While the work of Denison (1962), Jorgenson et al (1967, 1987, 1988), Grilliches (1979)
amongst numerous others lowered the growth attributable to technical change, the point remained germane.
8See for instance Solow (1957, 1959).
9See Solow (1959) and Nelson (1964). Hulten (1992) provides a more modern perspective including on the empirical
importance on the embodiment debate.
10See for instance the synoptic discussion in Romer (1994). The point is that one of the empirical implications of the
Solow-Swan model is that once di⁄erences in investment and labour force growth rates between countries have been
taken into account, they should converge to a common per capita level of output. While the empirics are contested, it
turns out that at least arguably economies are diverging, even when a whole range of additional growth determinants
have been accounted for. The famous explanation of Romer (1986) is that this is due to the fact that the technology of
production is subject to increasing rather than decreasing returns to scale. Variations on the theme are now myriad.
We deal with some of the seminal contributions.
11Besides the classic contributions of Schumpeter (see for instance the beautifully concise 1943: Chapter VII, and
also 1912), Arrow (1962) e⁄ectively provides the theoretical foundation to Romer (1986), which in turn arguably
sparked the endogenous growth debate. Further important contributions came from Shell (see for instance 1966)
4technical discussion of new growth theory and its relation to human capital investment see Fedderke
(2002).
2.2.1 Endogenous technological change: knowledge spill-over e⁄ects, or learning by
doing
New growth theory received perhaps its most often cited impetus through the work of Paul Romer.
The argument presented in Romer (1986) introduced the possibility that the very process of being
engaged in a productive activity generates learning e⁄ects, by allowing those who are engaged in
productive tasks to become more e¢ cient at performing them.12
The Romer-1986 proposition in fact has two important components: the process of learning-by-
doing, and the view that such learning will be available to all ￿rms in an industry. To the existence of
learning-by-doing is added the additional presumption that any knowledge gains obtained from the
process of production and investment cannot be internalized by the ￿rm in which that knowledge-
creation takes place. Thus the learning spills over to become available to all labour, and all producers
in the economy.13 With spill-over e⁄ects, the suggestion is that knowledge production is an inad-
vertent side-product of all production and investment activity, and would thus take place whether
￿rms wish to undertake it or not, as long as they are engaged in their standard productive activity.
The e⁄ect of knowledge spill-over is to ensure that the e¢ ciency of the labour input at the social
level will improve. The consequence of this is that the production function comes to show increasing
returns to scale at the social level (because of constant social returns to capital).
The crucial di⁄erence between the Romer-1986 growth model and traditional growth models
relates to the nature of the capital stock in the economy. Once social returns to scale in capital are
constant, it immediately follows that the marginal product of capital becomes constant also. As a
consequence, in the Romer model the incentive to invest does not change with a rising capital labour
ratio, since the marginal product of capital and hence the pro￿t rate is constant. As a consequence,
there is no reason for economic growth to ever ￿slow down￿once it has started. This stands in stark
contrast to the depiction of the growth process under Solow-Swan we encountered above.
One advantage of the Romer model is that it is able to account for the failure of poor countries
to catch up with rich countries. Since the incentive to invest does not decline with rising per capita
capital stock the growth rate of the capital labour ratio and of per capita output does not change
either. As a consequence, there is no reason why countries which have high per capita output should
grow any slower than countries which have low per capita output, such that there is no inherent
tendency toward catch-up as is present in traditional growth models ￿ indeed the absolute gap
between rich and poor countries may increase over time.
However, it is important to realize that the source of the non-declining incentive to invest in
Romer-1986 models arises due to knowledge spill-overs, which ensure a non-declining marginal
product of capital. Such a perfect public good characteristic of technology is a strong assump-
tion to invoke ￿and as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) demonstrate, even partial excludability of the
knowledge spill-over e⁄ects has the e⁄ect of destroying the unbounded growth result. Moreover, not
only are knowledge spill-overs within countries potentially imperfect, but Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) demonstrate that while capital and technology may move between regions, the rate of dif-
fusion is not instantaneous, but takes time. Hence the public good characteristic of technology on
which the central Romer-1986 result relies, is at least questionable.
amongst others.
12For some useful re￿ections on some potential limitations that attach to Romer￿ s twist on Arrow (1962), see Solow
(1997). Solow extends the discussion to a case in which learning by doing is bounded. On a prior approach to bounded
learning by doing see Young (1993).
13An illustration of the potential signi￿cance of spill-overs is given by Landes (2000). Contrast the strong attempts
to control the dispersion of knowledge concerning the construction of time pieces in China (2000:30), and the e⁄ects of
the strong guilds in much of Europe (2000:222⁄), with the relatively free circulation of ideas and expertise in Britain
(2000:231f). Britain won the ensuing contest.
5A second limitation of the Romer-1986 approach is that technological progress, while technically
endogenous to the model, remains essentially unexplained as an intentional activity on the part of
economic agents. What has changed from traditional growth theory is that technological change
has an explicit origin (in investment in physical capital stock). But in another sense technological
change continues to ￿just happen￿as a by-product of intentional activity directed not at technological
change itself, but at a quite di⁄erent productive activity. The expectation is of a reward not from
technological change per se, but from the act of investment in physical capital. Even the most
cursory consideration devoted to the advancement and transmission of knowledge both by the public
sector (see universities for instance) and the private sector (R&D expenditure of pharmaceutical and
software companies, for instance) is an indication of the fact that such an understanding of the source
of technological progress must have strong limitations. Indeed, any pure public goods conception
of knowledge will struggle to account for intentional private sector allocation of resources to the
advancement of knowledge.
Nevertheless, to the extent that Romer-1986 is accepted, it carries with it the clear policy implica-
tion that private investment requires government subsidy. Since private investors cannot internalize
knowledge spill-overs, private marginal returns to investment will be lower than the social marginal
return, such that private investors will under-invest in physical capital from a social perspective.
2.2.2 Endogenous technological change: the intentional creation of new knowledge
through research and development
The obvious question to ask is: how to treat the production of new technology as an intentional
human activity? One answer to this question is the theme of the Schumpeterian tradition in economic
growth theory.14 There exist a number of important contributions within this broad approach,
including those by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Here we follow Romer (1990), since it serves to illustrate some important generic features of such
models.
The crucial theoretical move is that knowledge is no longer treated as a (pure) public good.
Instead, knowledge is treated as a mixed good, with both public and private good characteristics.
The assumption is now that technological change has Schumpeterian characteristics, in the sense that
agents consciously engage in technological change and innovation, responding to market incentives
as they do so, and the only reason they do so, is that they are now in a position to internalize
positive net marginal bene￿ts from undertaking innovative activity.
On the other hand, knowledge is not held to be a pure private good either, in the sense that to
some extent it will be non-rival.15 Once it exists, the marginal cost of allowing another agent to use
that knowledge would be zero. However, since access to knowledge is excludable, agents who have
control over knowledge will no longer be price-takers, but have monopoly power over the innovations
they initiate. In e⁄ect we will have monopolistically competitive markets in the economy. The
consequence is that the social marginal return to knowledge will exceed the social marginal cost of
knowledge, and again the private sector will under-invest in knowledge. In contrast to the knowledge
spill-over model though, where the policy prescription was for production and investment subsidies,
here the policy implication will be for subsidies to the production of knowledge.
In the full Romer (1990) model the economy produces research output, intermediate goods (cap-
ital) as well as ￿nal output for the purpose of consumption. For our present purposes we can focus
14See Schumpeter (1943: Chapter VII) as an often cited starting point.
15In order to understand why knowledge might have both private and public good characteristics, we can distinguish
between two di⁄erent forms of knowledge. The ￿rst, human capital, is both rival and excludable, hence strictly private.
The second, technological design, is non-rival, since once created a design could be made available to other potential
users at zero cost. On the other hand it is excludable, in the sense that private, pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms will seek to
keep exclusive use of any design innovations they have funded. Such excludability may take the form of trade secrets
guarded from industrial espionage, and more formally patents forcing any user of a design innovation to pay for its
use.
6on the relatively simple process governing the production of research output. Production of design
output (new technology) uses simply human capital and the accumulated stock of human knowledge,
the sum of all previous designs in existence. We can ￿know￿patents, and in particular the principles
and insights that they embody, even where we are excluded from actively using them in production.
As such, the principles and insights embodied in patents are available to researchers to further their
production of knowledge.
Production of knowledge then depends simply on the accumulated stock of already existing
knowledge, the human capital devoted to research, and a research success coe¢ cient.
We should note two important elements to this statement. The ￿rst is the explicit use of human
capital in knowledge creation. The second is that this human capital is explicitly devoted to knowl-
edge creation, rather than inadvertently as a by-product of some other undertaking (such as ￿nal
goods production). As the Romer model makes explicit, the human capital resources could equally
well have been used for the purposes of producing ￿nal output. Knowledge accumulation depends
both on agglomeration e⁄ects (in already existing knowledge) and on the resources (of the speci￿c
human capital variety) devoted to knowledge accumulation. Technological advance takes place not
because of ￿money￿being thrown at the problem. The requirement is for focused deployment of the
very speci￿c resource of human capital being devoted to it.
The model goes on to demonstrate that under these circumstances, the growth in output in the
long run will come to equal the growth rate in technology. Since human capital can be used either
in the production of new technology or in the production of ￿nal output, this implies that the more
human capital is employed in ￿nal goods production rather than ￿research￿into the advancement
of knowledge, the lower will be the long run growth rate of output in the economy. Long run growth
depends immediately on the stock of accumulated knowledge, on the human capital devoted to
research, and on the e⁄ectiveness of the human capital engaged in the research.
2.2.3 Providing a counterpoint to endogenous growth theory by extending Solow-Swan:
a direct impact of human capital?
One of the implications of the endogenous growth literature is the introduction of human capital into
the analysis, particularly through its contribution to the innovative activity of the research sector of
the economy. One advantage of the introduction of human capital is that increasing returns to scale
in production technology can be realized, and hence the possibility of unbounded growth provides
an explanation of the empirical observation of divergence between rich and poor countries.
An alternative approach to the role of human capital in growth is to introduce human capi-
tal directly into the production function as an additional factor of production, while maintaining
constant returns to scale in production technology. Under these circumstances the introduction of
human capital does not have unbounded growth as a consequence. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
suggest that the introduction of human capital into a Solow model is justi￿able, indeed desirable,
since by 1969 in excess of 50% of the capital stock of the USA took the form of human rather than
physical capital stock. Moreover, they argue that the introduction of human capital into the Solow
model successfully enhances its explanatory power to such a degree as to preclude the necessity of
resorting to endogenous growth models.
The implication Mankiw et al draw from their empirical results is that the human capital aug-
mented Solow-model, despite its simplicity, accounts for a signi￿cant proportion of cross-country
variation in per capita output. They argue that the strength of the empirical evidence has to be
accepted as forceful evidence in favour of the model - and that recourse to endogenous growth theory,
given all the complexity it often introduces, may simply not be necessary. Di⁄erences in per capita
output between countries on this explanation would be due simply to di⁄erences in their endowments
of physical and human capital.
72.3 Further re￿ ections on endogenous growth theory
In an extension of the spill-over approach to endogenous growth, Lucas (1988) proposed a production
function in which production is constant returns to scale, but in which the possibility of increasing
returns is introduced through the impact of the generally available human capital. In a Lucas (1988)
model one can show that the ￿nal growth rate of the economy will be determined by the rate of
growth of human capital creation. Moreover, growth will turn out to be unbounded even in the
absence of increasing returns to scale, because of the implied growth in the e⁄ective labour force of
the economy due to investment in human capital. The result is analogous to the unbounded growth
due to technological progress in traditional theories of economic growth, but now with an explicit
recognition that the motor force behind this growth is human capital formation.
Where we also have increasing returns to scale in production an additional implication is that the
rate of return to human capital will prove to be highest where it is most abundant. In the presence
of labour mobility, the implication is that labour well endowed with human capital will migrate to
centres already intensive in human capital, because the rewards of doing so are large.
The policy implications for developing countries are profound. It implies that if a country is
behind in the accumulation of human capital it is likely to remain forever behind. Countries ahead
in the growth race will steadily out-accelerate any lagging country due to the increasing returns in
human capital. Worse, if a developing country tries to rectify matters by improving investment in
human capital, such human capital is simply likely to emigrate. The situation for poor countries is
doubly perverse. They are poorly endowed with human capital. But the policy intervention designed
to rectify the situation ￿increasing saving in order to be able to invest in education - merely serves
to bene￿t the already rich.
Thus if human capital matters for growth, and if increasing returns to human capital are present,
poor countries face the tough task of having to keep the environment for skilled people at home even
more attractive than otherwise would have been the case. Policy intervention must be conscious of
the need to improve the incentive for human capital to stay, rather than leave.
Increasing returns to scale in human capital may lead to perverse international allocation of
human capital. But this unfortunate international allocation of human capital may well be exac-
erbated by a further counterproductive intranational human capital allocation. Under the Romer
(1990) conception of the interaction between growth and technology, we have a sector dedicated to
the creation of knowledge using human capital as an input, but with human capital also used in the
production of ￿nal output. The di¢ culty for developing countries is that at low levels of human cap-
ital accumulation, there may simply not be the critical mass of human capital to generate su¢ cient
returns from the pursuit of new knowledge. As a consequence human capital will come to migrate to
￿nal goods production rather than new knowledge production, because the return to human capital
in ￿nal goods production is higher. The net result is a permanent decrease in the developing country
growth rate, while developed nations with higher agglomerations of human capital will be able to
take advantage of higher growth rates due to their ability to create new knowledge on the back of
higher concentrations of human capital devoted to knowledge creation.
Thus developing nations are potentially caught in two vicious cycles that result from the impact of
human capital on long run economic performance. The one results in an unfavourable international
allocation of human capital away from developing nations to developed nations. The other ensures
that what human capital remains in developing nations may not be allocated to where it has the
most dramatic long term impact.
2.4 Augmenting our understanding of growth: other factors
Thus far our exposition of growth has focused on physical capital and innovation, including the
impact of human capital on long run development. It would be surprising if this was all that
mattered to accumulation. A range of additional factors has been identi￿ed as drivers of economic
8growth. In what follows we list some of these, though space constraints preclude a comprehensive
exposition.
2.4.1 The role of ￿nancial capital and the ￿nancial system
The ￿rst additional determinant of growth we introduce is ￿nancial capital. Identi￿cation of ￿nancial
capital as a growth determinant emerged out of a debate surrounding the role of the ￿nancial system
in the economy.16
Some economists have argued that the ￿nancial system could be an inhibitor to development,
since savings of the economy could be placed in the ￿nancial system without being transmitted
onward to investors for the purposes of augmenting the physical capital stock of the economy.17 The
net e⁄ect would be to lower the e⁄ective savings rate in the economy. The ultimate impact would
be to lower the per capita capital stock and output of the economy. The policy prescription of this
line of reasoning was ￿nancial repression: taxing money holdings in order to force savings to be
transmitted onward to investors.
The argument in favour of ￿nancial repression has always been controversial, for two reasons. The
￿rst is that money balances may themselves be a productive asset used in the process of production,
particularly in less developed countries where credit systems as means of insuring against cash ￿ ow
constraints are poorly developed.18 Under the view of money as a productive rather than idle asset,
money will allow the economy to realize a higher level of per capita output than in its absence.
Hence, the ￿nancial repression policy prescription to emerge from the Tobin model serves to actively
damage one of the productive factors of production, severely harming the growth prospects of the
economy.
The second reason relates to the function of the ￿nancial system in the economy. The ￿nancial
system is constituted by the interaction of savers and investors in the economy, and operated by
￿nancial intermediaries who facilitate the transactions that take place between lenders and bor-
rowers in the economy.19 In doing so, the ￿nancial system and the ￿nancial intermediaries that
operate within it have the e⁄ect of lowering transactions costs of lending or borrowing: information
and search costs are lowered, risk is transformed (lowered) and the maturity structure of debt is
transformed to the bene￿t of both lenders and borrowers. The point is quite simply that given
the e¢ ciency-enhancing e⁄ects of the ￿nancial system on both lending and borrowing, it is di¢ cult
to understand how or why the presence or operation of the ￿nancial system should have a growth
inhibiting e⁄ect on the economy.20 Indeed, proponents of ￿nancial deepening suggest that far from
16For a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this section, see Kularatne (2002).
17Tobin (1965, 1967) provides the theoretical justi￿cation for ￿nancial repression. In this model, disposable income
may either be consumed or saved. It is argued that with the introduction of money balances, agents may either
allocate savings by investing in physical capital stock (as in Solow-Swan) or to real money balances. Agents are
therefore able to intertemporally transfer value either in the form of physical capital, or by increasing their real money
balances in the present period, thereby increasing their purchasing power in future time periods. Two assets now exist
in the economy - physical capital and real money balances. The net e⁄ect of money in the Tobin Model is to decrease
the e⁄ective rate of savings available for the augmentation of the physical capital stock. Instead of being exclusively
available for allocation to investment, savings come to be allocated to idle money balances instead ￿at least in part.
As a result the per capita level of physical capital, and hence labour productivity in steady state will come to be
negatively a⁄ected by the presence of money. The argument is essentially that there may exist a Keynesian liquidity
trap in the economy ￿here properly understood dynamically (see Keynes 1936:351).
18For an early expression by way of rebuttal to Tobin, see for instance Levhari and Patinkin (1968). They argue
money to be a productive factor of production. Just as production depends on ￿xed capital, so it depends on working
capital too. Real money balances constitute the quintessential working capital, and may thus be viewed like any other
inventory item that enters into the production process. With the absence of this medium of exchange, the economy
would revert to a barter system with its ￿double coincidence￿of wants constraint. The result would be an ine¢ cient
use of resources, preventing money from improving the productivity of labour and capital by allowing for greater
specialization in their use.
19In the tradition of Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960) and following. A further classic reference is McKinnon (1973).
An extended discussion can be found in Fry (1995, 1997), while Levine (1997) provides an overview of the issues.
20Financial intermediaries aid investment and economic growth by mobilising savings. They provide lenders ￿nan-
9repressing the ￿nancial system, policy makers should aim at deepening the ￿nancial system as a
means of improving long term economic performance.
Empirical evidence has favoured the ￿nancial deepening argument. Levine and a number of co-
authors ￿nd that the degree of development of ￿nancial intermediation in the economy is positively
related to long term growth performance for a large cross-section of countries. King and Levine
(1993b) ￿nd that moving from the mean ratio of liquid liabilities of the ￿nancial system to GNP
of the slowest growing quartile of countries (0.2), to the mean ratio of the fastest growing quar-
tile of countries (0.6), would raise average annual growth rates of per capita GNP by 1% (which
would account for approximately 20% of the di⁄erence in growth rates between the two groups of
countries).21 Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998) add to the ￿ndings, by presenting empirical evidence
suggesting that ￿nancial deepening should include both improvements in ￿nancial intermediation,
and in the quality of equity markets ￿the two forms of deepening are complements rather than
substitutes.
The international empirical evidence thus favours not only e¢ cient ￿nancial intermediation but
also the improved liquidity of the stock market as a source of increased levels of per capita GDP.
A liquid stock market encourages investment since it enables investors to cheaply, e¢ ciently and
con￿dently trade ownership of claims.22 The more easily they are able to vary the composition of
their portfolio, the less reluctant agents will be to subscribe to new share issues. Levine (1997)
incorporates two measures of liquidity - the turnover and value-added ratios. The former is the
ratio of total value of shares traded to stock market capitalization (the value of listed shares on the
country￿ s exchanges) of an economy while the latter is the total value of shares traded to GDP.23
The empirical evidence also suggests that the two generic types of ￿nancial systems to be found
internationally are complementary. In the Japanese/German style system ￿nancial intermediaries
play a more prominent role than the stock market in the provision of credit while in the Anglo-
Saxon ￿nancial system brand the opposite holds. However, the role played by each institution in
stimulating growth through the provision of credit may alter as the economy grows. At least one
study ￿nds ￿nancially more developed economies to have a more securities-based ￿nancial system
since they also tend to have stronger shareholder rights and higher accounting standards.24
The international evidence also indicates that the ￿nancial system may have both an indirect
and a direct e⁄ect on economic growth. The indirect e⁄ect is via improvements in the investment
rate and total factor productivity.25
A ￿nal issue that continues to attract attention is the question of the direction of association
between the real and ￿nancial sectors. In particular, whether ￿nancial deepening is simply the
consequence of economic growth, or itself stimulates growth. King and Levine (1993a), using post
war international data, argue that the level of ￿nancial intermediation is a good predictor of economic
growth. In such cross sectional studies, however, causal inference is restricted to the observation that
economies with greater ￿nancial depth at a given point in time, appear to grow faster in subsequent
time periods than those with lower initial levels of ￿nancial activity. Examining the results of time
series studies on the topic may therefore prove to be more useful. One such study conducted by
cial instruments of high quality and low risk, and buy the liabilities of borrowers at lower liquidity, lower yield and
a larger principal. See Levine (1997). This enhances the level of savings, investment and thus economic growth.
Moreover, since ￿nancial markets are faced with information and transaction costs due to the existence of asymmet-
ric information, ￿nancial intermediaries reduce the ensuing ine¢ ciencies by acquiring information on the quality of
individual loans. In the process of acquiring this information on the quality of the individual risk pro￿le of borrowers,
￿nancial intermediaries engage in risk transformation by engaging in portfolio diversi￿cation and risk pooling. There-
fore, due to the prevalence of asymmetric information in the ￿nancial sector, the argument in favour of money as a
factor of production in the economy only appears to be viable if a well-functioning ￿nancial sector exists (If ￿nancial
intermediaries are ine¢ cient credit rationing may occur).
21And see also King and Levine (1993a, 1993c).
22See Levine (1997) and Levine and Zervos (1998).
23Though see Levine and Zervos (1998) on the potential pitfalls of the value-traded ratio.
24For example see Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Levine (1999).
25For example see Neusser and Kugler (1998).
10Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) ￿nds that ￿nance predicts growth with little evidence of feedback from
output to intermediation for ￿ve industrialized countries from 1870-1929. Jung (1986), however, ￿nds
a bi-directional link between the ￿nancial and real variables in post war data. The study is unable
to disentangle direct e⁄ects from feedback e⁄ects. Patrick (1966) postulates that the direction of
causation changes over the course of development. He argued that the bi-directional relationship
present in certain studies may be attributed to ￿nancial deepening inducing real innovation-type
investment and, ￿as the process of real growth occurs, the supply-leading impetus gradually becomes
less important, and the demand-following ￿nancial response becomes dominant.￿Although the latest
studies favour ￿nance leading growth, Patrick￿ s (1966) argument is borne out empirically by Jung
(1986).
The upshot of the evidence seems clear: a robust ￿nancial sector, with minimum ￿nancial crises,
is essential for growth and poverty reduction, with no empirical support for policies that arti￿cially
constrain equity markets in favour of credit extension or vice versa.
2.4.2 The role of economic policy
An important extension to the debate on the determinants of long run growth performance, concerns
the role of demand side policy intervention by government.26 In the most immediate sense the
question appears strange, since growth is concerned with the long run performance of the economy.
The expectation would in general be that the long run aggregate supply curve assumes a vertical
slope, leaving demand-side intervention largely ine⁄ective. Nevertheless, two considerations render
an examination of the role of demand side policy important. First, decades of Keynesian demand
side policy management have generated a wide-spread belief that demand side stimulus may lead to
an enhanced growth performance. Second, and more importantly, developments in macroeconomic
theory have come to highlight the possibility that demand side policy may have either distortionary
or e¢ ciency enhancing impacts on the supply side of the economy. The growth performance of the
economy may therefore respond to the extent and nature of demand side policy interventions.
Cross-sectional studies (across large samples of countries) of the determinants of economic growth
generally ￿nd the impacts of both government consumption expenditure and the in￿ ation rate to be
negative.27 A distinguishing feature of these studies is that the policy variables enter the speci￿cation
linearly. Either of the feasible signs on the policy variables implies a corner solution that seems
implausible. Complete reliance on private markets is challenged at least by the literature surrounding
the impact of human capital on economic growth. Complete nationalization of the economy is
di¢ cult to justify on e¢ ciency grounds. The implied interpretation of the policy variables in growth
studies is that they capture piece-wise linearity. A better solution, therefore, would be to recognize
the likely non-linearities explicitly.
The idea is that for relatively low levels of government consumption spending and in￿ ation, the
impact on the growth rate may be positive but as the ratio of government consumption spending to
26For a fuller discussion of the issues addressed in this section see Mariotti (2002).
27Barro (1991) and Fischer (1993) found that government consumption expenditure has a negative e⁄ect on economic
growth. Moreover, it has been shown that government consumption expenditure is negatively related to private
investment (Barro 1991), which Levine and Renelt (1992) show to be one of the key determinants of economic growth.
Fedderke (1999) shows that private investment and growth are more highly correlated in South Africa than any other
form of investment expenditure. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) by contrast ￿nd that the mean growth rate of the
ratio of government spending to output has a positive e⁄ect on GDP growth, although Levine and Renelt ￿nd the
impact to be negative and insigni￿cant. Grier and Tullock (1989) repeat the work of Kormendi and Meguire on a
larger sample of countries, and ￿nd both the in￿ation rate and government consumption expenditure as a proportion
of GDP are negatively related to growth. Very few of the studies listed above focus on the e⁄ects of monetary policy
on growth. De Gregorio (1993) compensates for this by conducting an empirical study, which examines the impacts
of various types of monetary measures on growth. The main ￿nding is that average in￿ation has a negative e⁄ect on
the growth rate. Finally, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) introduce another aspect of ￿scal policy in an investigation of
the impacts of the tax rate on GDP growth. The ￿nding is that as the marginal tax rate increases, the growth rate
declines. However, as non-tax revenue increases, the growth rate increases thus suggesting the desirability of a low
tax rate.
11GDP and the in￿ ation rate increase they begin to have negative e⁄ects on GDP.
Two papers have examined an alternative suggestion that the relationship between policy vari-
ables such as government consumption and in￿ ation rates and growth is non-linear. Barro (1990)
develops a theoretical model demonstrating the feasibility of the existence of an optimal level of
government expenditure.28 Mariotti (1992) develops a distinct model with the same implication,
and adds an empirical estimation of the relationship to long run South African growth, reporting
strong statistical support for the presence of the non-linearity.
The advantage of incorporating non-linearity in the association between economic policy and
growth is not only that the theory carries more plausible implications. It would also serve to explain
why di⁄erent studies might have found either positive or negative associations, or indeed statistical
insigni￿cance in the relationship. It is simply a question of whether a piece-wise linearity could be
legitimately assumed over the domain of the estimation.
2.4.3 The role of governance
Once the possibility of heterogeneity of countries in the relatively limited dimensions provided by
Solow-Swan type growth models is recognised, the possibility that heterogeneity in other dimensions
may be of signi￿cance to growth follows readily. We have already seen the level of human capital,29
the depth of ￿nancial development,30 and the the nature and quality of government intervention in
economic processes,31 introduced as extensions of the basic framework.
Yet even after correcting for a wide variety of additional explanatory variables, many growth
equations struggle to account for cross country variation in growth, particularly in Africa and Latin
America.32 Such limitations to growth models has resulted in greater emphasis being paid to the
interaction of economic growth with the wider "social" or institutional setting within which economic
growth takes place.33
Modernization theory postulates a link from economic development to democratisation, such
that "good things go together". Political freedom is e⁄ectively viewed as a luxury good whose high
income elasticity ensures emergence of democratisation only at high levels of per capita income.
That the severity of class con￿ ict declines with rising per capita income, and that strong forms of
associational life develop as the economy grows, further reinforces the emergence and sustainability
of democratic institutions. However, since the postulated causality runs from economic to political
development, and since the link is viewed as existing between the levels of economic and political
development, modernization theory in its initial format has little to say concerning the impact of
political and social institutions on economic growth.34
An extension to modernization theory is thus an investigation of the possibility of a link from
political and social institutions to economic growth. One possibility might be that political freedoms
might have positive externalities in reinforcing economic freedoms, strengthening both the demand
28Despite the possible existence of an optimal level of policy the question remains of whether this level will be
reached. There are two issues surrounding the achievement of the precise optimal level. Firstly, public choice theory
suggests that such an achievement may be di¢ cult. There is disagreement about the ability and desire of policy
makers to achieve the optimum. Proponents of the public choice view argue that macroeconomic policy makers act
to maximise their own welfare rather than social welfare. See Tullock (1976) and Buchanan and Wagner (1977).
Thus the goals of policy makers are not necessarily consistent with the achievement of social optimality, nor is there
necessarily consistency in determining the goals of policy.
29See Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
30See King and Levine (1993a,b,c).
31See Barro (1990), Fischer (1991).
32See for example Barro (1991), and the discussion in Easterly and Levine (1997).
33A brief overview of the literature follows. For a more extensive review see Fedderke (1997), and also Fedderke
(2001b).
34The seminal contribution is Lipset (1959). For further supporting evidence see Bilson (1982), Bollen (1979),
Bollen and Jackman (1985), Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Cutright (1963), Diamond (1992), Helliwell (1992),
Inglehart (1997), and Theil (1979).
12for and the defensibility of the latter.35 An alternative proposition might be that externalities are not
positive but negative, since democracy at low levels of development is subject to populist pressure
for redistributive policies, with negative consequences for savings rates, relative price distortions
and uncertainty.36 If institutions do matter in the determination of economic growth, it follows that
where institutions are inappropriate, they will in turn come to inhibit economic growth.37
A crucial question concerns the reason for the existence of a link from political institutions to long
run economic performance - i.e. just why we might expect positive externalities to be present. One
suggestion has been that the credibility of political dispensations is critical if political institutions
are to avoid time-inconsistency problems. Time inconsistency emerges when policy makers have an
incentive to alter long-term policy commitments at a later stage. Its chief e⁄ect is to undermine
the credibility vital to maintaining private sector and foreign investor con￿dence (the argument
is analogous to those surrounding the credibility of stabilization policy).38 Property rights are
also frequently identi￿ed as the institution of greatest signi￿cance to economic growth, lowering
uncertainty and transactions costs associated with economic activity.39 An analogous but broader
conception is that of social capital, viewed as consisting of a range of formal and informal cultural
practices which increase the probability of cooperative solutions to problems of collective action,
and which is again viewed as lowering transactions costs and uncertainty, and hence as bene￿cial to
economic growth.40
The basic proposition of a possible link between economic and political development has also
received a number of extensions. Thus for instance political instability has generally been viewed as
lowering econ omic growth by raising uncertainty, and by reducing the quality of economic policy
formulation.41 However, where political instability disrupts rent-seeking activities it may have a
positive impact on growth42, and some authors have suggested the presence of simultaneity between
growth and stability by pointing to the possibility that growth may disrupt traditional social forms.43
Some studies go further in identifying income inequality as a speci￿c cause of the growth inhibiting
political instability or redistributional policies noted in the preceding discussion.44
While the literature has gone some way toward introducing a number of distinct links between
social and political institutions and economic growth, empirical evidence is as yet inconclusive in
the sense that a number of the postulated, but alternative and occasionally contradictory links have
found empirical support. Fedderke and Klitgaard (1996, 1998) demonstrated that the presence of
strong webs of association amongst social indicators, makes an empirical distinction between the
theoretical propositions outlined above di¢ cult. Moreover, it is argued that potential simultaneity
35This might be termed the Hayek-Friedman perspective. Empirical evidence in support is provided by Grier and
Tullock (1989) and Kormendi and Meguire (1985). The latter ￿nd political institutions impact on growth not only
directly, but also indirectly via the investment rate.
36See the discussion in Landes (1990). Barro (1994) provides empirical evidence in support of a negative impact of
democracy on growth, as does Marsh (1979) with quali￿cation, and Weede (1983).
37See particularly Mauro (1995), but also Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1991, 1993), Rama (1993).
38See Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995), who see credibility as of far greater signi￿cance than the level or stability
of political rights.
39See Knack and Keefer (1995), North and Thomas (1970, 1973), North (1981, 1990), Scully (1988, 1992).
40See Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1995) and Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b).
41Alesina and Perotti (1993), Barro (1991), Londregan and Poole (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995), all report em-
pirical ￿ndings con￿rming both a direct and indirect (via the investment or saving rate) impact of political instability
on growth. See Olson (1993) on the link between political stability and the quality of economic policy formulation.
On the link between instability and excessive foreign debt burdens and capital ￿ight see Alesina and Tabellini (1989)
and Ozler and Tabellini (1991).
42Olson (1982), who argues that (severe) political instability may disrupt the hold of rent-seeking interest groups
on the state, and thereby raise economic growth.
43See Olson (1963). Londregan and Poole (1990) con￿rm the presence of simultaneity between economic growth
and political instability, but ￿nd economic growth lowering instability.
44See Alesina and Perotti (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Clarke (1995) ￿nds not only indirect e⁄ects
of income inequality on economic growth (such as the investment channel noted above), but a direct negative e⁄ect
of inequality on growth, for both democratic and autocratic regimes. However, some studies ￿nd no systematic
relationship at all (see Papanek and Kyn 1986).
13between institutional dimensions and economic growth (for which empirical evidence is advanced),
circumscribes the reliability of standard statistical estimation results given the present level of the-
oretical understanding of the link between institutions and economic growth. Our theoretical and
empirical understanding of the link between social and political institutions and economic growth
is as yet at an early formative stage, in which the relative importance of the various institutional
dimensions cited, their mutual interaction, the lags with which they may be said to operate, are all
as yet incompletely determined.
3 International monetary, capital ￿ ow and trade regimes
The period since the middle of the nineteenth century can be divided into four subperiods as far as
the international monetary order is concerned: the international gold standard up to 1914, a period
of confusion between 1914 and 1945, the Bretton Woods and ￿xed rate dollar standard era between
1945 and 1971, and the period since 1971 which saw the rise of a tripolar monetary order based
on the dollar, deutschmark and yen, a rapid increase in international capital ￿ ows and ￿nally the
development of the European monetary system into the eurozone.
The international gold standard, especially with the resumption of convertibility in the United
States in 1879, covered all the major industrial economies and most smaller agrarian ones. McKinnon
(1993) was able to write down a quite simple set of ￿ rules of the game￿for this period. Each country
established a gold price or ￿ mint parity￿and converted freely between domestic money and gold
at that price. The set of mint parities established a set of exchange rates. There were no o¢ cial
controls on the movement of gold, and the system was self-regulating. An out￿ ow of gold would lead
to higher domestic interest rates, de￿ ation and a corresponding correcting in￿ ow. Equally, an in￿ ow
of gold would lead to lower interest rates, stimulation of the domestic economy and a corresponding
correcting out￿ ow. It was a system in which the Bank of England played a leading role, but where
co-operation by Germany, France and the United States became increasingly important.
Bairoch (1974) divides the period into two: between about 1860 and 1880, there was a regression
in the relative volume of trade between Europe and the Third World. Continental Europe was then
in a relatively free trade phase, so the importance of intra-European trade rose. After 1880, there
was a rise in the relative volume of exports to the Third World, especially to Africa. As a rule,
the trade balance was more favourable for countries exporting agricultural products, so that trade
with the Third World resulted in trade de￿cits for Europe. Green and Urquhart (1976) consider
the relationship between population movement, savings and capital ￿ ows before 1914, concluding
that (a) international movements of people and capital were not coterminous (b) in some countries,
notably the United States and Germany and Italy after 1890, domestic savings were su¢ cient to
support high rates of growth and (c) that there were countries (notably Argentina, Australia and
Canada) which had large international borrowings, high immigration and high growth rates.
By contrast, the second period between 1914 and 1945 was so tumultuous as to defy consistent
characterization. Convertibility was suspended by many countries during the Second World War. A
new gold standard was established in a rather ragged fashion in the 1920s, only to be abandoned by
many countries in equally ragged fashion in the 1930s. Henderson￿ s (1955) division of the interwar
period is standard: (a) a phase of in￿ ation and foreign exchange confusion from 1919 to 1925 (b)
a phase of expansion and large scale US lending in the later 1920s (c) the phase of world economic
crisis from 1930 to 1933 and (d) a phase of partial recovery from 1933 to 1939.
Eichengreen (1992) has argued that the gold standard of the 1920s set the stage for the depression
of the 1930s by heightening the fragility of the international ￿nancial system. Re-establishment of
the gold standard after 1918 was made di¢ cult by the di⁄erent wartime in￿ ationary experiences of
countries and by disputes of war debts and reparations. Political and economic developments also
compromised the autonomy of central bankers. The extent of de￿ ation required by the operation
of the gold standard from time to time and country to country was simply no longer tolerable,
14especially in the face of large imbalances. The credibility and co-operation central to the operation
of the gold standard declined. Eventually recovery was only possible once the gold standard had
been abandoned.
Trade and capital ￿ ows were both strongly a⁄ected. Lewis estimated that, using an index of
100 in 1913 for the terms of trade of primary products, the index fell to 70.5 in 1921, rose again
to 93.0 in 1927, fell to 65.1 in 1932 and rose to 81.4 in 1937.45 After 1933, the volume of trade in
primary products shrank relatively to manufacturing output because of measures taken by industrial
countries to promote domestic revival without a corresponding increase of imports. These measures
included selective import controls, protective import restrictions, preferential import restrictions,
barter trade arrangements, commodity regulation schemes, international cartels and state trading.
The United Nations estimated that about $2 000 million annually of long-term and short-term
capital moved on balance in the mid-1920s from capital exporters (principally the United States,
the United Kingdom and France) to developed, semi-developed or underdeveloped debtor countries.
After 1928 the ￿ ows slowed. First France reversed its capital out￿ ow, then the United States capital
issues for foreign account declined. Such capital ￿ ows as occurred increasingly took place within
blocs of countries rather than through an open world market. International lending activities were
curtailed also by the plight of many debtor countries whose terms of trade had deteriorated. Security
of investment rather than yield became an increasing concern, especially in the light of increasing
exchange controls and risk of default. There was no return to a steady capital ￿ ow between creditor
to debtor countries between 1932 and 1939.
Under the gold standard, countries submitted their exchange rates to an international standard.
In the late 1920s and 1930s, countries were subject to the beggar-my-neighbour devaluations and
protectionism of other countries. By contrast, the Bretton Woods system was designed to protect
the autonomy of national governments to determine their own national policies. Exchange rates had
to be ￿ exible, but not continuously ￿ oating. Changes in the exchange rate were to be discrete and
infrequent. A consequence was the segmentation of national capital markets, so that international
capital ￿ ows did not have to be considered continuously, as became necessary in the 1970s and
beyond. In the event, although Bretton Woods did not require it, the post-war system became a
￿xed rate dollar standard up until 1971, when the United States was no longer willing to sustain
the system and devalued.
In retrospect, the 1945-1970 period has come to be seen as something of a golden age in twentieth
century economic history. One suggestion is that a major part of the rapid rate of growth came from
the catch-up e⁄ects occasioned by the Second World War￿ s destruction of physical capital in Europe
and Japan.46 A temporary depression in the relationship between human and physical capital can
give rise to a temporary increase in the growth rate.47 The economies of the United States and
United Kingdom grew more slowly.
The devaluation of the dollar led to what McKinnon (1993) has called a ￿ ￿ oating dollar￿standard
from 1973 to 1984. If the currency of a country other than the United States weakened, the country
usually reacted by contracting its domestic money supply, as happened in the Bretton Woods era.
The United States itself conducted its monetary policy independently of the foreign exchanges.
This led to considerable ￿ uctuations in the world money supply and made exchange rates more
variable, circumstances which the more co-ordinated macroeconomic policies of the late 1980s and
early 1990s tried to alleviate. Greater capital mobility from 1980 made these problems more di¢ cult.
The transition from the Bretton Woods era meant that the attempt to explain exchange rates by
trade patterns became obsolete. With the rise in capital ￿ ows that followed, asset based approaches
have been more appropriate for some time.
Some of the developments since the 1970s have returned the world to a regime akin to that of
the late nineteenth century, albeit with much more sophisticated ￿nancial markets and settlements
45See Lewis (1952).
46See for instance Olson (1982).
47See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995): 172-179.
15often at the speed of light, and without the nominal anchor of the gold standard, which kept prices
stable. More than half a century of tari⁄ reduction negotiations under the General Agreement on
Trade and Tari⁄s and the World Trade Organisation have not entirely undone the protectionism of
the interwar period or bouts of it thereafter.
The survey of modern growth theory and the account of the capital ￿ ow and trade regimes
since the middle of the nineteenth century have identi￿ed the issues for discussion in the South
African record. It is now time to consider that record itself, employing mainly narration and simple
tabulation for the earlier periods and econometric techniques for more recent decades.
This section delineates the main features of economic growth during the four sub-periods iden-
ti￿ed in Section II, i.e 1870-1914, 1914-1945, 1945-1970 and 1970-2000.
Pre-1945 statistical information is sparse. A full set of national accounts, for instance, dates only
from 1946. General assessments of the determinants of growth in the ￿rst two periods are provided
in this section. The narrative treatment of the second two sub-periods in this section is brief, since
Section IV provides a detailed econometric treatment of the period after 1945.
4 South African growth before 1914: diamonds, gold and
agricultural exports
4.1 Diamonds
Alluvial diamond mining commenced along the Orange and Vaal rivers in 1867; the real action started
in Kimberley three years later. Britain was prompt to annex the town as part of Griqualand in 1871
and it was incorporated into the Cape Colony in 1880, pre-empting the sort of political con￿ ict which
was to arise later over gold. The foreign capital requirements for diamond mining were modest. Only
small amounts of capital were applied to the alluvial diggings and to the Kimberley diggings before
1885. Pro￿ts were so large among the successful that most capital requirements could be ￿nanced
directly from them. In 1938, Frankel estimated than probably no more than £ 20 million of foreign
capital had been invested in the diamond industry.48
The early 1880s saw a struggle for dominance between diamond producers and by 1885 De
Beers was pre-eminent, Rhodes obtaining complete control over the company two years later. The
emergence of De Beers as pre-eminent solved two problems: ￿rstly, it concentrated capital to an
extent su¢ cient to ￿nance deeper level mining in Kimberley and secondly, its monopoly status
enabled it to control supply and hence avoid over-production, a role it was to play for over a
century. The control of production suited not only De Beer￿ s interests; it also ensured a steady ￿ ow
of revenues to the Cape Colonial government. Directly and through improving credit, the ￿ ow of
revenues permitted the rapid expansion of infrastructure. Between 1875 and 1895, the extent of
Cape railways increased from 150 to 2 253 miles.49
Apart from expansion of state capacity, the spin-o⁄s of diamond mining were twofold. First, it
induced a range of activities from agriculture to small manufacturing to services designed to meet
Kimberley￿ s needs. Second, it created accumulations of capital useful in the development of gold
mining.
4.2 Gold
Developing the diamond mining industry was child￿ s play compared with the challenges facing the
gold mining industry after the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Very soon, the
problem of ￿nancing deep level mining emerged and was resolved by the group system. Most
individual mines belonged to groups which raised and channeled ￿nance; certain kinds of technical
48See Frankel (1938:53).
49For an extended discussion of infrastructure development in South Africa, see Perkins (2003).
16expertise were also attached to groups and were available to work on the problems of individual
mines. Financing the gold mines was not straightforward. Frankel estimated that about 60% of the
£ 200 million invested in the Witwatersrand mine was foreign. But the number of foreign investors
prepared to stick with mining investment in South Africa was small, the willingness to invest was
strongest when interest rates in Europe were low, and the investment was risky, with a low average
yield of 4.1% between 1887 and 1932.50
In addition to individual mines and mining groups, the Chamber of Mines was formed to attend
the interests of the mining industry as a whole. Through it was formed the Witwatersrand Native
Labour Association in 1896 to manage the supply of African labour, a second major problem for
the gold mines. The ￿rst agreement with the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique about the
recruitment of mine labour was negotiated the following year. Closely related was the issue of working
costs, partly because the mines were producing the commodity at the heart of the international
monetary system and whose price was ￿xed in sterling terms, and partly because the body of
exploitable ore varied inversely with working costs. The labour and the working cost issues were
far from being fully resolved by 1910. This a⁄ected the extent of the ore which it was pro￿table to
mine. In 1898 the average ore grade being mined was nine pennyweight per ton; forty years later,
the mines were able to mine ore of half that quality.
The most intractable di¢ culty the mines faced within the ￿rst ￿fteen years was the relationship
with the government of the South African Republic. A great deal has been written about the rising
tensions which led to the South African War of 1899-1902. But a single episode shows clearly
the clash of interest between the mines and the state. In 1897, Kruger￿ s Executive Council, in an
attempt to resolve di⁄erences with the mining industry, set up an industrial commission of enquiry
into the industry. The industry was represented on the commission. When it reported in July 1897,
it re￿ ected the concerns of the industry comprehensively. It identi￿ed state concessions (granting
of monopolies, in particular for the production of dynamite), railway rates, duties on foodstu⁄s
and poor enforcement of laws a⁄ecting mining all as putting up costs in the mining industry.51
Concessions, high railway tari⁄s and duties were all economically ine¢ cient ways of extracting
resources from the mines. This meant that the social costs exceeded the revenue raised, and the
revenue itself landed up in the pockets of concessionaires as much as in the state treasury. Some
adjustments were made as a result of the report, with new duties imposed to ￿nance them, but
they failed to accommodate the industry in any serious fashion. When Smuts and Leyds re-opened
negotiations with industry leaders in 1899, the situation had become too polarized to allow of any
success.
The Transvaal colonial administration governed in a way more consonant with growth than the
South African Republic had done. For instance, the report of the 1904 Transvaal Census showed that
there were twice as many children in school in that year than there had been in 1898. The records
of all four colonial administrations indicated an increasing propensity to work together, paving the
way for Union in 1910.
4.3 Agriculture
South Africa was an exporter of agricultural goods before it exported anything else and by 1910 it
was exporting nearly £ 10 million of agricultural goods made up as follows:
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In 1912, South Africa could be characterized as an open economy. Total exports of South African
produce amounted to £ 23.2 million, excluding ships￿stores and gold. Gold exports were £ 38.3
million. National income in that year was £ 132.9 million. This level of national income had been
reached by substantial capital imports, both directly in the gold mining industry and indirectly
through loans to colonial governments as their revenues expanded. The export of gold and diamonds
could have taken place under any international monetary and trade regime, but agricultural exports
were facilitated by low levels of protection elsewhere. Manufacturing was a tiny proportion of
national income (less than 7%) and an even smaller proportion of exports.
One problem facing the Union was the inheritance of a high level of public debt, standing at
£116.0 million in 1910 and representing 96% of national income in 1912.52 Of the inherited debt, £
74.1 million had been incurred on railways and harbours and a further £ 17.1 million had its origins
in war, defence and post-1902 reconstruction in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.
Another was the low level of education. Evidence from the 1960 Population Census indicates
that white people born in 1885 achieved, on average, eight years of education. Everyone else born
in that year achieved an average of less than two.
On the other hand, the level of development of ￿nancial institutions was substantial. There were
￿ve banks trading in the Union in 1910, as well as a Post O¢ ce Saving Bank. The Land Bank was
created by statute in 1912 and started operating the next year. The Cape alone had 34 life assurance
companies.53
The features of the international economic regime which assisted South African growth between
1870 and 1914 were the free ￿ ows of direct and portfolio capital and the free trade regime. South
Africa did well to attract the volume of mining ￿nance that it did and pushed infrastructural
development to the limit, creating a somewhat precarious ￿scal inheritance at Union.
5 South African growth between 1914 and 1945: exogenous
shocks and the rise of manufacturing
5.1 The growth record




Period I saw an increase of £ 48.2 million in national income, period II an increase of £69.4
million and period III an increase of £155.2 million, all in 1929 prices. The last period of growth was
52Union Year Book 1910-1916: 636
53Union Year Book: 1910-1916: 644-649
54See Frankel (1944: Introduction).
18by far the strongest, and the ￿rst period the weakest. Periods II and III can be clearly identi￿ed in
Figure 1, which shows that Period III stretched on into the War.
The extent of growth in the ￿rst period is very uncertain. The di¢ culty lies in (a) the lack of
information about nominal national income in the period between 1912 and 1918 and (b) the lack
of a reliable GDP de￿ ator and the consequent need to use the retail price index instead in a period
when prices were increasing rapidly.
In his study of the business cycle, Schumann found that there was mild economic prosperity
between 1910 and the middle of 1913, followed by uncertainty and recession until early 1915 and
then an upswing until mid-1920.55 However, Schumann￿ s indicators were a mixture of real and
nominal variables, so his study does not overcome the di¢ culty of distinguishing real from nominal
e⁄ects in this period.
By contrast, it is clear that there was substantial growth in Periods II and III. The period as a
whole is one of punctuated growth. The punctuations originated in adverse external shocks to the
economy.
5.1.1 The adverse shocks
The ￿rst adverse shock was a massive increase in the wholesale price index of imported goods, which
started in 1915 and peaked in 1920. There was a later, and smaller, increase in the wholesale price
index of South African goods.56 The prices of South African tradeables would have responded to
war-time and immediate post-war in￿ ation in trading partners. There would have been little reason
for the price of non-tradeables to rise. Accompanying this price shock was a rapid increase in the
quantity of money in circulation: from £25.7 million in 1914 to £65.8 million in 1919.
In￿ ation was followed by de￿ ation. South Africa, like Britain, remained on the gold standard
until 1918. After that, the sterling price of gold rose from £4.25 per ounce in 1918 to £5.59 in 1920,
but then dropped to £4.61 in 1922.
In 1922, Britain announced its intention to return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity.
This it did in 1925. This was the second adverse shock. The logic of the decision is that prices
and nominal wages (except in so far as there had been productivity gains) would return to pre-war
levels. What made the gold standard everywhere less suitable for the period after 1918 compared
with the late nineteenth century, was the shift in social power towards workers, resulting in greater
downward stickiness of nominal wages. The de￿ ations required by the use of the gold standard were
harder to impose.
In South Africa, the second adverse shock cast its shadow before it. The sector most sharply
a⁄ected was mining. Working costs, both in the form of material inputs and wages had risen from
1915. The payment for a machine stopping contract shift in the gold mines on the Witwatersrand
rose from 29s 10d in 1916 to 49s 10d in 1921. In other parts of the mining sector, there was a similar
rise, though not so steep. With the prospect of a drop in the sterling price of gold, the wage level
was not sustainable. The mines proposed a rise in the proportion of ￿ non-white￿labour (paid at
much lower rates). The white workers resisted, rebelled and were defeated in early 1922. Payment
for a machine stoping contract shift fell to 30s 4d in 1922. Mining wages remained low until the late
1920s, in contrast with the pattern in manufacturing and on the railways and harbours.
The third adverse shock was the fall in commodity prices from 1929. This hit non-gold exports
which fell from £ 44.2 million to £ 17.9 million between 1929 and 1932. Recovery of non-gold exports
was relatively slow and they did not reach 1928 levels again until the closing years of the second
world war. Agriculture, particularly, and parts of manufacturing were a⁄ected by the drop in foreign
demand. Gold exports came to the rescue, growing from £ 25.8 million in 1928 to £ 47.6 million in
1932, largely softening the shock from other commodity prices to the balance of payments. In terms
of production, the agricultural and commercial sectors were hardest hit.
55See Schumann (1934).
56In the 1914-1945 section, except where otherwise stated, statistics are taken from Union Statistics for Fifty Years.
195.1.2 Departure from the gold standard
South Africa left the gold standard at the end of 1932 and the e⁄ect on the economy was immediate.
The sterling price of gold moved up from £ 4.31 in 1932 to £ 7.10 in 1935. It was stabilised at £ 8.40
between 1940 and 1945. Gold output ￿ uctuated between 1932 and 1937 and rose from 11.7 to 14.4
million ounces between 1937 and 1943, falling back to 12.2 million ounces in 1945. The gold price
shock was all the more e⁄ective for occurring in a de￿ ationary world economic environment and
with substantial unemployment at home. Both these factors meant that the stimulus fed through
to real variables rather than to price levels, at least until the second world war started.
5.2 Manufacturing
In 1911, half of manufacturing industry consisted of the processing of food, drink and tobacco. The
rest consisted mainly of building materials, construction, printing, wagons and carts, explosive for
the mines, foundries and small engineering for the mines and railways, matches, soap and candles,
leather, some electricity and gas, clothing and footwear.57 Between 1912 and 1939, value added
in private manufacturing rose from £ 8.9 million to £ 53.8 million. The increase in output was
accompanied by considerable diversi￿cation: motor vehicle assembly (1922), textiles and cotton
spinning, diamond cutting and the manufacture of rubber tyres and the metal trade. The Iron and
Steel Corporation (ISCOR) commenced production in 1933.
How much of this progress should be attributed to state intervention? Intervention had more
than one form. There was the conventional dimension of import tari⁄s, imposed in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Cullinan Commission on Trade and Industries of 1910-11. These were
(a) that a fair proportion of the raw material used is or can be obtained in South Africa (b) that a
fair proportion of White labour is employed and (c) that there is a reasonable chance of the industry
being established.58 Import tari⁄s were overhauled in 1925, and in 1939 import duties amounted
to 14.25% of the value of imports.59 A degree of protection for inland industries could be obtained
by manipulating railway tari⁄s. South Africa had a degree of natural protection simply by virtue
of its distance from other industrial countries. This natural protection was considerably enhanced
during both world wars, leading to an acceleration of import substitution in those years. In line with
Cullinan objective (b), White employment as a proportion of total employment remained roughly
constant (and high) between 1918-19 and 1938-39 (38% and 39% respectively), compared with 12%
and 13% in mining.
There was also direct state intervention through legislation in 1928 to establish ISCOR and
through the establishment of the Industrial Development Corporation, which was designed to help
capitalise South African businesses, many of whom found it hard to raise capital by themselves.
Capital intensi￿cation, to judge by the available indices, proceeded fairly slowly. In 1915-16, there
were £ 180 of land, buildings and machinery and 1.13 horse-power of motive power for every worker in
manufacturing. By 1938-39, these ratios had risen only to £ 216 and 1.68 horse-power. Dependence
on imported raw materials remained high: 51.0% of raw materials for manufacturing were imported
in 1916-17 and 48.3% in 1938-39.60 Frankel estimated in 1944 that for every £ 100 of goods imported
by manufacturing industry, exclusive of imports and machinery, only £ 7.6 was exported by it.61
Manufacturing, therefore, critically depended on exports from other sectors, notably mining.
57See Pearsall (1937:412).
58See Pearsall (1937:413-14).




Gold output was determined by a complex set of factors: the exhaustion of old mines, the develop-
ment of new ones, the markedly slower rate of investment in them between 1914 and 1932 compared
with the pre-1914 period (after 1932 the investment rate rose sharply in response to a higher gold
price), developments on the labour front, ￿ uctuations in the gold price and the level of working costs.
Between 1910 and 1922, gold sales ￿ uctuated between 7.0 and 9.3 thousand ounces. Thereafter, sales
generally increased from 9.1 thousand ounces in 1923 to 14.4 thousand ounces in 1941, falling back
to 12.2 thousand ounces in 1945.
Milestones in relation to mine labour were threefold. The outcome of the 1922 strike settled
the question of the ratio of White to African workers substantially on the industry￿ s terms. The
agreement with Mozambique was renegotiated in 1928. Most importantly, permission to recruit
￿ tropicals￿￿labour from north of 22 degrees south ￿was given provisionally year by year from 1933
and was then embodied in the Immigration Amendment Act of 1937. The increasing reliance on
foreign labour was what made possible the stabilisation in real terms of African wages between 1911
and 196962.
5.4 Agriculture
The physical volume of ￿eld and livestock products from commercial farms rose fairly steadily from
1910 to 1945. Using an index set at 100 for 1937, production in 1912 was at 46, rising to 57 in 1920,
90 in 1930 and 104 in 1945. The problem facing agriculture was taken to be unstable prices. Hobart
Houghton pointed out that the price of wool (internationally set) varied from 32.9d per pound in
1920 to 10.7d in 1921, 21.6d in 1925 and 4.5d in 1932.63
However, value added in agriculture ranged from an index of 46 in 1912 to 101 in 1920, 70 in
1930 and 162 in 1945, again with 1937 set as 100. Dividing the nominal value index by the physical
volume index gives a rough agricultural price index which varied from 90 in 1912 to 177 in 1920,
77 in 1930 and 151 in 1945. This was not so far from the wholesale price index for all goods which
varied from 86 in 1912, 214 in 1920, 98 in 1930 and 153 in 1945, the main deviation being in the
1929-32 depression.
The state￿ s response to problems in agriculture was to intervene extensively. Frankel observed in
1938 that there had grown up a system of tari⁄s, subsidies, quotas, price regulating and marketing
schemes which was remarkable in its wide rami￿cations, contradictions and complexities. He esti-
mated that the state had spent over £ 71 million from loan funds and £ 41 million from revenue
funds on agriculture between 1910 and March 1936.64 Richards estimated the social cost of the
divergence between agricultural costs of production and prices amounted to £ 7.5 million in 1933,65
a year in which agriculture￿ s contribution to national income was £ 30.6 million. Neither Frankel
nor Richards thought value for money had been obtained. Frankel pointed out that agriculture was
more dependent on the rest of the economy in 1938 than ever before. Richards, while noting that
developments in South Africa were similar to those elsewhere, pointed to the ine¢ ciencies of resource
allocation occasioned by the system and the impossible burden of co-ordination by the state.
5.5 The labour market and the creation of human capital
5.5.1 Labour absorption
For the period 1914-45, yearly employment statistics were collected only for mining, private industry
(which included electricity, gas and steam and construction), and South African Railways and Har-
62See Wilson (1972).
63See Hobart Houghton (1971:24-25).
64See Frankel (1938:119-122).
65See Richards (1935:384).
21bours. Some of the agricultural censuses (1918, 1925, 1930, 1937 and 1945) collected employment
data, but not always for the same month of the year, making comparison more di¢ cult. Data on
employment for all sectors were made in the 1921, 1936 and 1946 censuses, though data for Africans
were collected only in 1946.
Labour absorption rates can be calculated for Whites, Coloureds and Asians in 1921 and 1946,
on the assumption that ￿ activities not described and unemployment￿ should not be counted as
employment. In 1921, 52.3% of Whites over the age of ￿fteen were employed; in 1946, it was 51.4%.
The corresponding estimates for Coloureds were 61.7% and 57.0% and for Asians, 62.9% and 44.1%.
The estimates for the three groups as a whole were 55.2% in 1921 and 52.2% in 1946. The small
drop in labour absorption means that the economy absorbed nearly all the increase in the relevant
labour force.
Less complete estimates can be obtained for Africans. Employment in mining, private manufac-
turing, electricity, gas and steam and on South African Railways and Harbours grew from 334 94866
in 1921 to 693 782 in 1946, or from an index of 100 in 1921 to 207 in 1946. The African population
size index grew from 100 in 1921 to 166 in 1946, so absorption in these sectors outstripped the
rate of population growth. Absorption in agriculture probably proceeded at a lower rate, but it is
impossible to hazard a guess as to what happened in the remaining sectors of the economy: trade,
other parts of transport, storage and communication and services.
The rapid growth in African employment in the 1930s in mining and manufacturing had the
consequence of putting pressure on the supply of African labour to farms, and in 1937 a committee
reporting to the Minister of Native A⁄airs was appointed to investigate the situation. The committee
found that there was indeed a shortage and suggested a set of measures designed to improve the
e¢ ciency of farm labour. However, the estimation of the size of the African labour force by the
committee was too low. They put it at 1 632 000, whereas application of the labour force participation
rate in the 1951 census to the 1938 population yields an estimate of 2 487 000, just over two million
of which would have been male. The latter estimate may, in turn, be too high, since labour force
participation generally rises with the level of development. Moreover, labour force participation may
indicate participation over part of the year, whereas employment estimates are often expressed as
person-years worked over the year. It seems reasonable to conclude that, against such practices as
seasonal work, labour-tenancy and spells of rest between contracts in the urban areas, the African
labour market tightened by the late 1930s and during the war.
5.5.2 Regulation of the labour market67
Throughout the period, the labour market was regulated on a segregated basis. The system for
African labour was administered under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and the Natives
(Urban Areas) Act of 1923, against the background of the entire system of segregationist legislation.
The 1911 Act provided for the proclamation of labour districts in areas where large number of
Africans were employed in mining, industrial or other work. In such areas, stricter pass regulations
were applied and managers were employed to supervise concentrations of African workers of ￿fty or
more. The system was based on that in operation in the Transvaal before 1910 and mostly applied
to that province. Fourteen labour districts in the Transvaal were initially proclaimed; by 1945, there
were eighteen labour districts in the Transvaal, three in the Orange Free State, two in Natal and
four in the Cape. None of the major urban areas outside the Transvaal were labour districts. There
was modest growth in African employment in the labour districts in the 1920s and much more rapid
growth in the 1930s. The mines, of course, had their own system.
Regulation of conditions under which Whites worked was more complex. O¢ cial anxiety about
the position of unskilled White workers was present throughout the period. Labour bureaus, mod-
elled on those in the old Cape Colony, were opened for Whites to help them ￿nd employment in
66The estimate for private industry is interpolated.
67Statistics in this section are taken from editions of the Union Year Book between 1916 and 1945.
22the major urban centres shortly after Union. By the early 1920s, concern was not simply over
employment, but also over wages.
Anxieties were heightened when the economy performed poorly, as it did between 1920 and
1922. The government instituted temporary relief works on government undertakings in late 1920
and employment on these peaked at 7 920 in August 1922, dropping to 4 284 in May 1923. It rose
again to 10 868 in September 1924, declining to 3 608 in December 1926. After that the number rose
once more, reaching 8 213 in December 1930. The relief works were categorised into subsidized works,
where funds voted by Parliament made up the di⁄erence in cost between White and African labour
and non-subsidized works, where the additional cost was absorbed by the employing agency itself.
Initially the railways and forestry projects took responsibility for the additional costs. Municipalities
also o⁄ered subsidized relief from 1924.
The civilized labour policy, announced in a Prime Minister￿ s circular in October 1924, had as its
goal the substitution, wherever practicable, of White (￿ civilized￿ ) labour for African (￿ uncivilized￿ )
labour in departments of state. This e⁄ectively augmented, and rendered permanent, non-subsidized
relief work and rendered it less visible over time, though statistics of both groups were kept separately
until the early 1940s. By March 1926, 1 361 substitutions of Whites for Africans had taken place.
O¢ cial awareness of the poor white problem also led to various schemes attempting to assist
them to farm. A work colonies system was created to which adults unwilling to work could be
committed. None of these schemes were extensive or e⁄ective.
The experience of the 1920s produced principles and the institutions for use in the depression
starting in 1929. A particular e⁄ort was started in the summer of 1932-33, whereby the Department
of Labour greatly increased expenditure of unemployment relief and subsidies to employers. Subsi-
dized employment on relief works peaked in mid-1933 at over 25 000 jobs. By July 1936, it dropped
to just over 10 000 and ￿ve years later it was little over a thousand. The number of adult White
males registered for unemployment followed the same patters: 9 917 in January 1932, a peak of 14
678 in July 1933 and 5 754 in July 1936.
Non-subsidized employment was 23 489 in January 1932 and grew for the rest of the decade to
30 880 in 1940; this component can be regarded as the continued workings of the civilized labour
policy. These numbers can be compared with the economically active White population of 740 544
as measured by the 1936 Census. Coloured workers also bene￿ted from employment on relief works,
both subsidized and unsubsidized. 4 305 were employed on them in January 1933 and 11 901 in
1940.
Taken as a whole, labour market regulation had the distributive e⁄ect of reallocating unskilled
wage labour from Africans to Whites. The impact of substitution on e¢ ciency of redistribution
can be divided into two parts: (a) the di⁄erence in productivity between the worker installed and
the worker displaced, which would have been small and (b) the di⁄erence in wage, which in all
cases was borne by the state (and therefore by the tax payer), either directly in higher costs of state
administration, or indirectly in the form of a wage subsidy to a private employer. The impact of high
wages for part of the population on economic growth was likely to have been limited. Except in the
case of transport, it did not have much impact on input prices. It did raise the cost of non-tradeable
government services and so mainly represented a transfer from taxpayers to white workers.
Although pass laws existed, the regulation of the movement of African labour was neither com-
prehensive nor strict enough before 1945 to impede movement to where jobs could be found, mainly
in the urban areas.
5.5.3 Human capital
The history of the 20th century has been a history of erosion of the educational attainment gap
between whites and all other population groups. People born in 1915 had the following average
educational attainments: Africans two years, Coloureds four years, Asian men ￿ve years, Asian
women two years and Whites ten years.
23Political changes and economic circumstances have had no detectable in￿ uence on this process
as it a⁄ects the number of years of education provided. Political and economic conditions have had
an in￿ uence on the relative quality of education provided.
In 1921, 591 468 pupils were in school. By 1945, the total had risen to 1 282 908, representing
an average annual increase of 3.3% per year, well ahead of population growth. The Coloured and
Asian share rose from 10.2% in 1921 to 17.0% in 1945 and the African share from 32.8% to 48.4%.
Over the same period, the number of university students rose from 3 389 to 14 504 and between
1927 and 1945 the number of technical college students rose from 15 278 to 42 132.
The quality of education in a segregated system varied. In the 1930s, Malherbe concluded that,
as a rule of thumb, one could regard the cognitive competences conferred by a given African school
grade as equivalent to those achieved by two grades lower in a White school.68
5.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
The ratio of public debt remained high in relation to net national income from 1910 to 1932, when
it peaked at 132% of net national income. It was the increase in the gold price from 1933 which
enabled the government to achieve the lower ratio of 73% in 1939. It rose again during the war to
88% in 1945.
Union expenditure exceeded union revenue by substantial amounts between 1912 and 1923. How-
ever, revenue was boosted by the introduction of personal income tax from 1915 and expenditure
was reined in after 1923 and the de￿cits were turned into surpluses in all years from 1924 to 1945
except 1931.
M1 (notes and coins in circulation plus demand deposits) stood at above 30% of net national
income in 1918 and 1919. Between 1920 and 1927 the ratio dropped to between 21% and 27% and
between 1928 and 1932 it dropped below 20%. For the rest of the 1930s it ￿ uctuated between 27%
and 34%. It rose during the war years to 57% by 1945.
In 1935, there were 75 building societies in South Africa, 46 permanent and 29 terminating. In
1943, there were 108 insurance companies, 30 of which had headquarters in South Africa.
5.7 Assessment
The period divides into two: from 1914 to 1932, when the South African economy was bu⁄eted by
adverse shocks coming from the international economic system, and from 1933 to 1945, when the
rise in the gold price and the heightened e⁄ective protectionism occasioned by the Second World
War permitted a sustained, rapid rate of growth. Most of the economic progress between 1914 and
1932 was made between 1922 and 1928.
State intervention became pervasive in agriculture, manufacturing and the labour market. It
was often wasteful, but it was not ruinous in terms of economic growth. Absorption of new entrants
into the labour market was high for the period between 1921 and 1946. Progress was made with the
development of human capital. And, after 1933, the state￿ s ￿nances were put on to a much sounder
basis.
The whole economic system grew up in the context of racial segregation, a system which was
bound to be undermined by increasing urbanization. Some contestation of the political system itself
had occurred by 1945. The next period in South Africa￿ s development was to see much more.
68Malherbe (1977).
246 The South African economy from 1945 to 1970: the Bret-
ton Woods years
The statistical record of growth improves dramatically after the introduction of the national accounts
in 1946. Table 1 compares the industrial structure of the economy in 1946 with that in 1970.
Real gross value added more than tripled in twenty-four years. The most spectacular growth
was in manufacturing whose share in gross value added nearly doubled between 1946 and 1970. By
contrast, the share of general government services dropped substantially over the period. There
was further diversi￿cation away from agriculture and mining, though this was the period of the
development of the Free State gold mines.
Implicit in the Bretton Woods system was the importance of a balance of payments constraint.
The automatic adjustments of the gold standard were replaced by two mechanisms for dealing with
a de￿cit on the balance of payments: changes in ￿scal and monetary policy, in the ￿rst instance, and
adjustment of the exchange rate in the second. Hobart Houghton identi￿es four occasions when such
adjustments were necessary. The ￿rst was in 1948/49 when there was a rapid increase in imports of
both consumer and capital goods. This was resolved when the United Kingdom devalued sterling in
1949 and South Africa immediately followed suit. The appearance of balance of payments de￿cits
in 1954 and 1958 were dealt with by ￿scal and monetary policy adjustments.
The fourth and most serious crisis was in 1960/61 after Sharpeville and the consequent political
unrest. Here the de￿cit arose on the capital rather than the trade account and it was met by
the imposition of controls over capital movements and an end to free convertibility of the rand.69
Capital controls were not uncommon in the Bretton Woods era and the political repression which
accompanied them restored stability to the point that it could underpin the rapid growth of the
1960s. But both the political and economic measures taken had long term costs. The proscription
of the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress drove them into exile and created
an increasingly potent form of o⁄-shore pressure on the apartheid state. The imposition of capital
controls created ine¢ ciencies, which would be increasingly felt in the post-Bretton Woods era.
Capital controls and a dual exchange rate also created incentives for capital ￿ ight, especially at
times of instability, which had reached substantial proportions by the end of apartheid.
Political repression made it possible to implement more fully two items of social engineering
which apartheid had embraced in the 1950s. The ￿rst was Bantu education which e⁄ectively closed
down private schooling for Africans and which was funded by an ungenerous and inelastic formula
from 1954: £ 6.5 million annually plus 80% of the poll tax on Africans. This did not stop increasing
enrolments, but it did lead to declining real per capita expenditure on African pupils. By the
late 1960s, the contribution from the poll tax had increased to 100%, ￿ loans￿had been granted for
African education and ￿nally the special Verwoerdian funding arrangements for African education
were terminated in favour of the standard process of budgetary allocation. But the damage was done.
Educational expenditure had become more ine¢ cient than before and Africans deeply resented it.
Average educational attainment among people born in 1940 was: Africans four years, Coloureds six
years, Asians eight years and Whites eleven years.
The second item was the attempt to distribute the population in line with the aims of territorial
apartheid. That this was ultimately impossible should not blind one to the large e⁄ects actually
achieved. There had been a not very coherent system of pass laws and in￿ ux control in the years of
segregation (eroded by the rapid growth from 1933), but it had not any discernible e⁄ect on African
urbanization up until the early 1950s. In￿ ux control was then strengthened, and for a period of
about twenty years from 1955, it slowed African urbanization substantially. There was a parallel
programme for the rural areas which took two main forms ￿the removal of people in ￿ black spots￿ , i.e.
African-owned land now regarded by the state as inappropriately located in relation to Bantustans,
and the removal of ￿ surplus labour￿from white commercial farms. Along with removals of Coloured
69Hobart Houghton (1971:39).
25and Asian people in terms of the Group Areas Act in cities, these measures a⁄ected millions of
people, and their e⁄ect on Africans was usually to move them further away from jobs. In 1950,
there were eleven Africans in reserves for every ten on commercial farms. By 1996, there seventy-
￿ve Africans in tribal rural areas for every ten on commercial farms. Achieving these objectives
necessarily entailed a massive assault on black property rights ￿and increased substantially the
search costs that future generations of workers faced for entry into the formal labour market.
Between 1945 and 1970, government revenue consistently exceeded government expenditure. In
1946, government debt stood at 89.7% of net national income. By 1970, the debt to GNP ratio had
dropped to 39.7%. In 1946, there were eight commercial banks in South Africa. In 1959, the number
of building societies had dropped to 28. In general, controls on capital movement and growing
international isolation reduced the number of private sector ￿nancial institutions through mergers
and acquisitions on the one hand and foreign withdrawal on the other.
Using growth accounting techniques, it is possible to identify the main drivers of growth in
manufacturing by sector between 1920 and 1969.
There are two distinct sub-periods (1920-1945 and 1945-1969), which di⁄er both in the rate of
growth, and in the primary drivers of growth. In particular:
1. On the whole, growth between 1945 and 1969 was higher than between 1920 and 1945, though
the 1934-39 period saw some very high growth rates. (After 1970, manufacturing growth fell
to the lowest recorded levels in the twentieth century.)
2. The period 1920-1945 is characterized both by a relatively diverse set of growth drivers across
industries, as well as within industries in di⁄erent sub-periods. Some industries relied on
capital accumulation, some on increasing employment, and some on Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) e¢ ciency gains for their growth. Equally, some industries relied on capital accumulation
in some sub-periods, and on e¢ ciency gains in others.
3. The period 1945-1969 is characterized by growth that is predominantly led by capital accu-
mulation.70
The main sources of manufacturing growth between 1920 and 1945 are reported in Table 2.
Those between 1945 and 1969 are reported in Table 3.
7 The South African economy since 1970: the turbulent
years
Apartheid was at its zenith in 1970, but the economy was soon to be a⁄ected by a number of factors,
both international and domestic. The suspension of dollar convertibility in 1971 ushered in a period
of uncertainty about the conduct of macroeconomic policy. The ￿rst oil price hike in 1973 a⁄ected
South Africa adversely as a net importer of oil. The Durban strikes of the same year signaled the
re-emergence of African trade unionism, dormant since Sharpeville. Six years later the government
was to recognize African trade unions as part of the o¢ cially sanctioned industrial relations system.
More serious than all these factors was the Soweto unrest of 1976, sparked by a dispute over language
of instruction. The lengthy and substantial confrontation was to set a precedent for political struggle
over the next eighteen years, and it had an immediate e⁄ect on con￿dence in the economy. The
second oil price hike struck the economy in 1979.
Despite these shocks, the economy grew at an average annual rate of close to 4% throughout the
1970s ￿faster in the ￿rst half of the decade than in the second. The beginning of the 1980s saw the
economy bene￿t from the gold price spike and in 1981, real per capita income achieved its highest
70Of course, the above is a broad-brush characterization of the evidence, and by its very nature hides substantial
nuance. For details, readers are referred to Fedderke and Schirmer (2004).
26level ever. From then until 1994, the trend was downwards with real per capita income in 1994 18%
lower than it had been thirteen years earlier. The immediate reason for downward movement was
the return of the gold price to lower levels. But the longer term reason was political instability.
The adoption of the tricameral constitution in 1983 and its rejection by African National Congress
aligned political groupings led to the formation of the United Democratic Front in 1984. This was
followed by the emergence of the limits of the willingness of the P W Botha administration to
negotiate in 1985, the imposition of ￿nancial sanctions, the uncertain and turbulent period until
the de Klerk administration removed political proscriptions in 1990, and the period of political
negotiation leading to the ￿rst universal franchise election in 1994.
Gross value added at basic prices increased by 73% between 1970 and 1994. Noteworthy is the
slight absolute decline and the large relative decline in mining over the period. The sectors showing
the greatest advance in relative terms were ￿nance, insurance, business services and real estate, and
government.
Average educational attainment among people born in 1970 was: Africans eight years, Coloureds
nine years, Asians and Whites close to twelve years.
The excess of government revenue over government expenditure remained positive until the mid-
1980s. Thereafter it turned negative and sharply so by 1993, contemporaneously with growing
political crisis. The position has improved since the adoption of the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution programme in 1996, a core aim of which was reduction in the budget de￿cit. The
ratio of government debt to GNP rose from 34.9% in 1985 to 51.4% in 1995, falling back thereafter.
In￿ ation rose from low levels during the early 1970s and ￿ uctuated around a level of approxi-
mately 15% from 1975 until the early 1990s. In the later 1990s it dropped to half that level.
8 Growth in the post-war period: the econometric evidence
and its interpretation
8.1 The contributors to growth71
The crucial initial question is whether growth in South Africa has been primarily driven by accumu-
lation in factor inputs, or whether growth has been led by e¢ ciency gains as measured by growth
in total factor productivity (TFP). Where it is the former, the explanatory task ahead is to account
for the drivers of investment in physical capital, and for the characteristics of the labour market.
Where TFP growth is dominant, it is technological progress and its determinants which are most
important.
International evidence from developed countries has often pointed to the signi￿cant contribution
of growth in total factor productivity rather than growth in factor inputs to output growth.72 In
e⁄ect, growth in output in developed countries is di¢ cult to explain by reference to growth in factor
inputs, and instead most economic growth is the result of technological advance.
International evidence shows that developing countries are di⁄erent.73 They often show a chang-
ing pattern of growth, beginning with a heavy reliance on capital growth, but shifting to total factor
productivity growth with rising per capita GDP.
In what follows we brie￿ y consider evidence on the structure of the South African growth expe-
rience over the 1970-97 period, employing standard growth accounting decompositions.74
71The discussion of this subsection draws substantially on evidence presented in Fedderke (2002a). Readers are
referred to this source for more detailed sectoral and temporal TFP decompositions, as well as real cost reduction
computations.
72See for instance Abramovitz (1956, 1986, 1993). For continued and more recent discussion of this evidence see
also Fagerberg (1994) and Maddison (1987).
73See for instance Lim (1994).
74Computation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth is by means of the standard primal estimate, computed
as the di⁄erence between real output growth and the growth rates in physical capital stock and the labour force,
27South Africa￿ s aggregate experience mirrors that of many developing countries. Figure 2 shows
that the contribution of growth in total factor productivity to South African growth in aggregate
output has been steadily rising since the 1970￿ s. As was the case in the preceding decades, the
1970￿ s and 1980￿ s saw growth that was heavily led by growth in capital and labour inputs, with very
little contribution by technology. In the 1990￿ s the situation is reversed. In the 1990￿ s growth in
the labour force input contributed negatively, and growth in the capital input contributed relatively
weakly to growth in GDP. Instead, the single strongest contributor to output growth during the
course of the 1990￿ s is a strong augmentation in technology.
Part of the reason for the change in the 1990￿ s was a decline in formal sector employment,75
so that growth in labour inputs could not possibly have added to the growth in real output of
the economy. The declining contribution of capital to the growth performance of the South African
economy is due to the declining investment rate that South Africa has experienced.76 We are thus left
with a ￿nding that the contribution of technological progress to South African growth in aggregate
has been rising since the 1970￿ s - though admittedly it has contributed a rising share to a declining
growth rate in output.
The aggregate evidence does hide strong sectoral di⁄erences.77 The only consistent feature across
all four principal sectors of the South African economy is that the contribution of labour toward
output growth has been on a downward trend from the 1970￿ s through to the 1990￿ s. In terms of the
contribution of growth in capital stock, we ￿nd that in the agricultural sectors, the mining industry
and the service industries capital has been of declining importance as a contributor toward output
growth, while for manufacturing industry it has assumed increasing importance. Finally, in terms of
the contribution of technological progress, the strongest e¢ ciency improvement has been evident in
agriculture, though the contribution declined during the 1990￿ s. Mining by contrast, while coming
o⁄a low rate of technological progress, has been on an upward trend, as has services. Manufacturing
has shown the weakest performance in terms of technological progress in the South African economy
- at least during the course of the 1990￿ s.78
The implication of the above evidence con￿rms our initial ￿nding: that technology as a contrib-
utor to economic growth in the South African economy has become increasingly important, though
sectoral di⁄erences cannot be neglected. In particular, the exception to this ￿nding is that in the
manufacturing sector speci￿cally the 1990￿ s have seen a process of restructuring, with a strong link
between growth in capital stock and output growth, and a declining importance of technological
innovation.
These ￿ndings lead on to further questions.
The changing structure of South African output growth deserves close attention. Why in par-
ticular has the growth in capital stock contributed in declining measure to the growth in output?
What is it about the labour market that has led to the decline in employment creation, and hence
to a virtual absence of labour as a positive contributor to output growth in South Africa? Further,
what else besides growth in factor inputs might come to raise real output? The rising contribution
of TFP growth gives us one indication - and raises a set of questions that arise from contributions
each weighted by its factor share. Evidence to emerge from this simple growth accounting decomposition can only be
understood to be broadly indicative. The literature on growth accounting since the contributions of Denison (1962,
1967, 1974) has provided further sophistication to the decomposition, and further extensions have emerged due to the
developments in endogenous growth theory (for a useful overview of the developments see Barro 1998, and for the
South African context see Fedderke 2002a).
75See the more detailed discussion in Fedderke and Mariotti (2002).
76See the more detailed discussion in Fedderke (2001a), and Fedderke, Henderson, Kayemba, Mariotti and Vaze
(2001).
77See Fedderke (2002a) for the full empirical evidence.
78In the more detailed evidence of Fedderke (2002a) we also present evidence on real cost reduction contributed
by each economic sector, following the methodology of Harberger (1998). The implication of the ￿ndings is that
technological progress in the manufacturing sectors is highly concentrated in individual sectors, rather than generalized
across all manufacturing sectors. Moreover, the sectors contributing most signi￿cantly to economic growth prove to
volatile across time, making the targetting of innovation incentives by policy makers di¢ cult.
28made to new growth theory. How in particular are we to understand the role of human capital, and
the contribution of explicit innovative activity (R&D) to TFP growth and hence output growth?
It is to this set of questions that we now turn our attention.
8.2 The Foundation of Long Run Growth: Investment in Physical Capital
Stock
A core determinant of long run economic growth is the investment rate in physical capital stock
in the economy. No matter whether we are referring to classical theories of economic growth or
modern endogenous theories of economic growth, investment in physical capital is consistently a
primary source of growth. Empirical investigations con￿rm the centrality of the investment rate in
physical capital. Levine and Renelt (1992) famously establish it as the single most robust variable
in empirical cross-sectional growth studies. De Long and Summers (1993) con￿rm its importance as
central motor behind long run improvements in per capita GDP.
This provides us with the obvious starting point for any investigation of long run growth de-
terminants in the South African economy. An understanding of the drivers behind South African
investment must form the most basic building block in coming to an understanding of the augmen-
tation of South Africa￿ s physical capital stock, and hence the growth rate of output.
In the discussion that follows we draw on work on the characteristics of South Africa￿ s capital
markets. We begin with a consideration of evidence on the determinants of investment expenditure.79
Further, in South Africa the private savings rate has never been able to match the private sector
investment rate (see Figure 3). In such a context the characteristics of the ￿nancial sector in the
economy becomes vital. We consider the role of the ￿nancial sector in two ways. First, we extend
our discussion of conditions in South African capital markets to a consideration of the importance
of international capital ￿ ows for investment in South Africa. Considering the determinants of such
international capital ￿ ows to South Africa then becomes a natural extension to our discussion of
investment in physical capital stock.80 Second, we consider the structure of South Africa￿ s domestic
￿nancial markets, and the role they have played in South Africa￿ s growth performance.81 Finally,
the evidence on the determinants of investment in physical capital stock points to the importance
of a reduction in uncertainty as a means of stimulating investment expenditure. One way of doing
so is to maintain macroeconomic stability. We therefore also consider the impact of macroeconomic
stabilization policy in the long run growth process.82
8.2.1 Econometric Evidence on the Determinants of Investment in South Africa
The modern theory of investment expenditure has come to be focused on the impact of irreversibility
and uncertainty. While recognition of the importance of these two determinants of a changing size
of the capital stock have been long recognized, recent contributions to the theory have provided a
more comprehensive understanding of the issues. Most important of these insights has been the
recognition that the impact of uncertainty on investment is ambiguous instead of unambiguously
positive as the early literature suggested.
Early work on the link between investment and uncertainty recognized that uncertainty would
be of material concern whenever ￿rms make irreversible commitments before the state of the world
relevant to the pay o⁄that is to be generated by the commitment is realized. The main ￿nding from
this early literature was that under constant returns to scale production technology, and assuming
uncertainty to attach to output price, the marginal product of capital is convex in the uncertain
79In this instance we draw extensively on the discussion and evidence contained in Fedderke (2001a).
80For this evidence we draw on the discussion in Fedderke (2001b), and Fedderke and Liu (2002).
81Here we draw on the evidence presented in Kularatne (2002).
82The discussion draws on Mariotti (2002).
29output price, such that rising uncertainty raises the marginal valuation of an additional unit of
capital and hence stimulates investment.83
The modern literature has emphasized that such a result need not hold under asymmetric ad-
justment costs. The discussion tends to be cast in terms of a stochastic dynamic environment.
Irreversibility of investment decisions and the possibility of waiting, means that the decision not to
invest at the present point in time can be thought of as the purchase of an option. The option has
value since waiting to invest in an uncertain environment delivers additional information. Investing
now rather than tomorrow thus has an opportunity cost associated with it. One of the core insights
of the modern literature is that uncertainty generates a reward for waiting, and hence that increases
in uncertainty will potentially lower investment.
However, this is not necessarily the case. A rise in uncertainty does indeed raise the threshold at
which investment will be triggered, and it is this which suggests a negative link between investment
and uncertainty. However, uncertainty may at least in part be due to an increased volatility of
pro￿t ￿ ows, such that the higher threshold level of pro￿tability is satis￿ed more frequently than
in a certain environment, generating more frequent bursts of investment expenditure. In this case,
increased uncertainty may be associated with higher investment expenditure on average, even though
the required net rate of return on investment required to justify the investment expenditure has
increased due to the uncertainty. The net e⁄ect of uncertainty on investment is thus ambiguous,
and a matter to be empirically determined.84
In the present discussion we examine the determinants of investment expenditure in South African
manufacturing industry ￿though results for aggregate investment rates in South Africa provide fur-
ther con￿rmation of the ￿ndings reported.85 Crucial here is that empirical applications of irreversible
investment models must control for the impact of uncertainty.86
Results from estimation are presented in Figure 4. Results con￿rm that standard theoretical
expectations on the rate of return on capital and the user cost of capital are satis￿ed. A rising
expectation on the rate of return on capital, and rising user cost of capital serve to raise and depress
the investment rate in physical capital stock respectively. In this regard investment in physical capital
stock in South Africa is thus susceptible to the standard policy levers associated with stimulating
investment expenditure.
The striking ￿nding is that uncertainty exercises a statistically signi￿cant and strong e⁄ect on
investment expenditure in South African manufacturing industry (see the comparison a⁄orded by
use of standardized coe¢ cients) . Moreover, the e⁄ect of uncertainty on investment is unambiguously
such as to lower investment rates. Lastly, in establishing the impact of uncertainty on investment
expenditure, it is vital to recognize that both systemic87 and sectoral uncertainty88 appears to be
pertinent for investment - though systemic uncertainty has a stronger impact than does sectoral
uncertainty. This result is a consistent and robust ￿nding regardless of which other variables are
controlled for in estimation.89
One explanation for the poor investment performance of the South African economy is thus the
pervasive uncertainty that has characterized, and continues to characterize South Africa.
A further implication that emerges from the empirical ￿ndings is that the standard policy handles
deemed important as a means of stimulating investment expenditure are found to be signi￿cant. Both
the proxy for the rate of return on capital stock, as well as the marginal cost of investment come to
determine the long run investment in South Africa. The implication of this is twofold. In the ￿rst
83For a review of the early literature, such as Hartman (1972) and Nickel (1978), see Aiginger (1987).
84A comprehensive coverage of the modern debate can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
85See Fielding (1997, 2000).
86See for example Ferderer (1993), and Guiso and Parigi (1999).
87See the Appendix for detail on this index.
88Measured as a moving average of a variance of output demand measure by sector.
89In estimation we also tested for the impact of credit rationing, openness of the manufacturing sectors to in-
ternational trade, technological progress, the skills composition of the labour force, the real wage, and government
crowd-in.
30instance the impact of factors that change the user cost of investment (or rate of return on capital) -
such as taxation rates for instance - can come to act either as deterrent or as enabler to investment.
Since changes in the real user cost of capital in￿ uence the investment rate of manufacturing sectors,
changes in the elements of real unit cost that government can in￿ uence will also carry with them
long run changes in investment rates. The corollary is that policy makers play a role in creating
the appropriate conditions for rising investment rates through an alteration of the real user cost of
capital.
Unfortunately the uncertainty ￿ndings come to modulate this ￿nding signi￿cantly, however. The
uncertainty ￿ndings carry with them both direct and indirect policy implications. First, the direct
policy implications arise from the direct (and large) negative impact of uncertainty on investment.
Thus stability at a systemic level appears crucial if investment rates in South African manufacturing
industry are to rise. This carries implications both for the conduct of macroeconomic policy and
the need for an emphasis on price stability in its conduct, but also for the importance of creating
a stable political environment able to pursue credible policy orientations over time. By the latter
we refer to the importance of creating a policy environment that renders the policy making process
predictable, rather than subject to problems of time inconsistency. Past political dispensations in
South Africa with their associated large discretionary power vested in the state, rendered the prospect
of arbitrary state intervention ever real. The move to a liberal democratic polity has lowered this
source of uncertainty and we have seen sound economic reasons for guarding this political advance
jealously.
But the importance of uncertainty to investment arises in more than the direct sense noted above.
The evidence presented has a¢ rmed the importance of uncertainty in lowering the investment rate
in South African manufacturing. This con￿rms not only the importance of adjustment costs as
determinants of investment expenditure, but also that uncertainty raises the threshold rate of return
below which investment is unlikely to occur. At least two further important policy implications ￿ ow
from this ￿nding. First, it implies that any policy intervention designed to stimulate investment
expenditure may face serious constraints in the sense that it may appear ine⁄ectual due to the
in￿ uence of the relatively high threshold below which investment is simply not triggered. Where
an industry is operating below the threshold rate of return on investment, policy intervention may
in fact be altering the rate of return on investment and hence the incentive to invest, but may not
trigger a physical investment response because the intervention has not been substantial enough
to breach the threshold. Thus there may be considerable scope for changing investment incentives
by means of policy intervention, without any appreciable change in the investment rate following.
The second policy implication then follows as a corollary. The creation of a macroeconomic as
well as microeconomic environment that is stable, predictable and devoid of sudden and arbitrary
intervention is a policy goal that emerges from the present study, not only because uncertainty has
a direct negative impact on investment rates in manufacturing, but also because it serves to lower
the threshold below which investment does not occur. In e⁄ect lowering uncertainty carries both a
direct positive stimulus to investment, and it serves to render other policy levers more e⁄ective in
achieving their objective.
For the time being we rest the case on uncertainty at this point. What will become evident
from the further evidence presented below is that the relevance of uncertainty is deeper than its
immediate signi￿cance in the context of investment in physical capital stock.
8.2.2 Extensions of the Debate on the Determinants of Investment in South Africa
The direct determinants of investment in South Africa have been identi￿ed in the preceding dis-
cussion. But a number of additional factors are also of importance. In the discussion introducing
the importance of investment expenditure, we pointed to the existence of a short-fall of private
sector savings relative to investment in South Africa. This raises the signi￿cance of the role of the
￿nancial sector in the South African economy in at least two distinct senses. First, it immediately
31identi￿es the need for in￿ ows of foreign capital into the South African economy ￿as is standard for
developing countries. Understanding the determinants of capital ￿ ows into and out of the South
African economy becomes a key to an understanding of constraints on the investment rate in the
economy. Second, it raises the question of the e¢ ciency of the South African ￿nancial sector as an
intermediary between savers and investors in the economy. The crucial question here is what role
the ￿nancial sector has played in e⁄ectively intermediating between economic agents with surplus
funds (savers), and those with opportunities to productively utilize those funds (investors). The
nature and role of the ￿nancial sector in the South African growth process becomes relevant.
A further consideration arises from the possibility that demand side policy intervention may
create an environment conducive to long run capital accumulation. The argument here is that
macroeconomic stability is crucial in creating appropriate levels of the net return on physical capital
to render investment attractive to the private sector but, above all, it is viewed as crucial in rendering
the return certain. In e⁄ect, demand-side policy intervention is viewed as an important channel by
which uncertainty faced by investors can be minimized. Here too, then, is a dimension which is
also relevant to the assessment of the wider enabling environment for investment in physical capital
stock.
8.2.3 The Role of the Financial Sector and Capital Flows
We have identi￿ed two important senses in which the role of the ￿nancial sector is relevant to the
growth process in South Africa. First, we are concerned with the determinants of capital ￿ ows
into the South African economy, as a means of relieving the savings constraint on investment in
physical capital. Second, we are concerned with the impact of the ￿nancial sector on economic
growth directly, as a determinant of the savings constraint in the economy.
We turn to these two questions in turn.
8.2.4 The Importance of Capital Flows: the return of uncertainty
A long-standing structural constraint in the South African economy has been the short-fall of savings
relative to the investment needs of the economy ￿see Figure 2 above. Except for very brief periods
in the 1960￿ s and the early 1980￿ s South Africa￿ s private sector has not produced su¢ cient savings
to cover its demand for physical capital formation. The implication is that South Africa has been,
and remains reliant on capital in￿ ows in order to ￿nance its physical capital formation.90
On the presumption that capital ￿ ows respond positively to higher domestic returns on assets,
and negatively to risk and higher returns on foreign assets,91 and employing a range of distinct
measures of capital ￿ ow,92 we report on estimates of the determinants of capital ￿ ows in Figure 5.
The crucial point to emerge for purposes of the present discussion is that the results do conform
to the portfolio theoretic expectations generated by the theoretical discussion contained in Fedderke
(2001b). Thus an improved rate of return on assets, and reduced risk on assets will increase cap-
ital in￿ ows into South Africa - though there are some di⁄erences between the various capital ￿ ow
measures on the imputed magnitude of the impact the various rate of return and risk dimensions.
The second point is that capital ￿ ows in South Africa prove to be sensitive to political risk. We
note that both changes in the level of political rights, and the level of political instability impacts on
capital ￿ ows. Higher instability, and political liberalization in South Africa both served to stimulate
capital out￿ ows. We note further that it is di¢ cult to argue that the three capital ￿￿ ight￿measures
90A factor that must also go some way toward explaining the relatively high interest rates the South African economy
maintains.
91For the detail, see Fedderke (2002b).
92Estimations are for the standard short and long term capital ￿ow measures reported in the balance of payments
(TNORM), and three measures of capital ￿ight constructed according to the indirect method (KFIND - see World
Bank 1985 for its construction), the balance of payments method (KFBOP ￿see Cuddington 1987), and the derived
method (KFDRV ￿see Dooley 1988).
32are more responsive to risk than the ￿normal￿capital ￿ ow measures of the balance of payments -
with the one exception of the KFDRV measure.
Estimation results thus establish a number of concrete and constructive results. Estimation
results suggest that capital ￿ ows for South Africa show strong sensitivity to risk factors, and political
risk factors in particular. We note that both changes in the level of political rights, as well as the
level of political instability impacts on capital ￿ ows. Greater instability, and political liberalization
in South Africa both served to stimulate capital out￿ ows.
The risk dimensions that proved to be crucial for investment in physical capital stock in South
Africa directly, thus transfer their importance to one of the crucial enabling conditions for invest-
ment in South Africa. Given the short-fall of private savings relative to investment expenditure,
we continue to rely on capital in￿ ows into the economy. Short of achieving an increase in the
social savings rate therefore, South African reliance on capital in￿ ows strengthens the need to min-
imize any source of uncertainty that may detract from investment directly, or from capital in￿ ows.
Transparency, predictability, credibility of political processes will serve a crucial role in determining
whether the process of democratization in South Africa brings about economic as well as political
bene￿ts for the majority of the South African population.
Further, to the extent that the aggregate growth measure contributes to the long run determina-
tion of capital ￿ ows, the implication is that capital in￿ ows follow on from the creation of favourable
growth prospects. Capital in￿ ows are thus potentially secondary stimuli to economic growth, in
the sense that they themselves respond to already favourable growth performance. Of course, the
additional capital in￿ ow may further enhance the growth in output.
Capital ￿ ows and ￿ ight have become more favourable to South Africa since the early 1990￿ s.
However, lowering political uncertainties, and the need to o⁄er healthy rates of return to potential
investors should continue to be a central concern of policy makers.
8.2.5 The Role of the Financial System
The ￿nancial system can no longer be regarded as a passive channel that allocates scarce resources
to the most e¢ cient uses. Today most economists agree that the ￿nancial system is essential for
development.93 They argue that a more e¢ cient ￿nancial system leads to higher growth and reduces
the likelihood and severity of crises.
Kularatne (2002) investigates the role of ￿nancial deepening in South African growth in the
post-war era. The study allows for both direct e⁄ects of the ￿nancial system on growth, as well as
indirect e⁄ects via a stimulus of the investment rate in the economy. In addition, Kularatne allows
for the possibility that a rising level of per capita output (as an indicator of the level of development)
may itself serve to stimulate the development of the ￿nancial system, i.e. that there may be feedback
from output to the extent of ￿nancial deepening. Finally, the study controls for both the impact of
credit extension by ￿nancial intermediaries in the South African economy, as well as the liquidity of
the stock market.94
The crucial ￿ndings to emerge from the study are:95
￿ That both forms of ￿nancial deepening (both credit extension and stock market liquidity) have
a positive e⁄ect on per capita GDP in South Africa.
￿ The impact of ￿nancial deepening on GDP is indirect, operating via the investment channel
rather than on output directly.
￿ There exist feedback e⁄ects from per capita output to ￿nancial deepening.
93For example see Levine (1997), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Levine, Loaysa and Beck (2000).
94This serves as the proxy for the ease of raising capital on equity markets in a wide range of international studies.
95The study is based on time series data covering the 1952-92 period. Estimation is by Johansen Vector Error
Correction techniques.
33￿ Development of the equities market appears to have stimulated investment in physical capital,
and hence output. Credit extension appears to have fuelled the development of the equities
markets in South Africa, and only through the equities market the development of capital and
output.
￿ In particular, a percentage increase in the ratio of total value of shares traded increases the
investment rate and per capita output by 0.28 percent and 0.30 percent, respectively. A
percentage increase in credit extension and per capita GDP increases the ratio of value of
shares traded by 0.26 percent and 0.83 percent, respectively. The e⁄ect of a percentage increase
in credit extension on per capita GDP and the investment rate is estimated to be an increase
of 0.08 percent and 0.07 percent, respectively.96
￿ The two dimensions of ￿nancial deepening are thus complementary to one another. Speci￿cally,
credit extension in the South African ￿nancial markets appears to serve as a means of improving
the liquidity of the stock market, rather than increasing investment in physical capital stock
directly. This may re￿ ect the historic role of the South African mining houses as a means of
raising capital on international markets. The ￿nancial deepening variable with the direct real
e⁄ect, is the measure of stock market liquidity.
Although one measure of the ￿nancial system (liquidity) a⁄ects per capita output indirectly via
the investment rate, credit extension appears to have no direct in￿ uence on the real sector. One
possible explanation for the absence of a direct association between ￿nancial intermediation and the
real sector may be attributed to the presence of credit rationing within the South African economy.
Firms may ￿nd it di¢ cult to source working capital from ￿nancial intermediaries for investment
projects. Indeed this is borne out by the evidence gathered by a recent World Bank Report on the
constraints to growth in South Africa,97 which supports the argument of the prevalence of credit
rationing within the South African economy.
Thus the central ￿nding of the Kularatne (2002) study on the impact of the South African
￿nancial system on long run growth supports the suggestion that ￿nancial deepening stimulates
economic growth. However, the impact of ￿nancial deepening is indirect, and operates by stimulating
investment in physical capital. Moreover, the ￿ndings suggest that the full potential growth stimulus
of the ￿nancial sector in South Africa has not been realized, since there do appear to exist some
constraints on the e¢ ciency with which ￿nancial markets operate in South Africa. Credit rationing
may therefore have constrained investment rates in the economy.
8.2.6 The Role of Demand Side Policy
As a ￿nal consideration under the examination of determinants of investment in physical capital,
we consider the role of government stabilization policy. One important implication of demand side
policy intervention is that it may create an environment conducive to long run capital accumulation.
The argument here is that macroeconomic stability is crucial in creating appropriate levels of the
net return on physical capital to render investment attractive to the private sector, but above all
it is viewed as crucial in rendering the return certain. In e⁄ect, demand-side policy intervention is
viewed as an important channel by which uncertainty faced by investors can be minimized.
Mariotti (2002) investigates the impact of two indicators of demand side policy in the post-war
South African growth: government consumption expenditure as a proxy for ￿scal policy stance,98
96Note that the relative e⁄ect of increases in liquidity vis-a-vis credit extension on per capita GDP may be exag-
gerated in the model. The variable measuring liquidity (ratio of value of shares traded to GDP) may be responding
to a larger set of variables than speci￿ed in the model, leaving open the possibility of misspeci￿cation.
97See World Bank Report (2000). The survey covers the 1998-99 period.
98Government consumption expenditure is utilized as a ratio to GDP. Government consumption expenditure consists
of remunerations, depreciation of ￿xed capital and intermediate consumption less fees and charges. It does not include
expenditure on education.
34and the in￿ ation rate as a proxy for monetary policy orientation.99 The study allows for both direct
e⁄ects of policy on growth, as well as indirect e⁄ects via a stimulus of the investment rate in the
economy.
The central ￿ndings to emerge from the study are:100
￿ In the long run increases in government consumption expenditure and in￿ ation lead to declines
in output, such that the economy moves to a lower steady state.
￿ There is a very short lived temporary increase in growth in response to expansionary demand
side policy. The stimulus is not sustainable. The dynamics indicate that the movement to
the new steady state is not linear, beginning with an increase in the growth rate of output
as government consumption expenditure and in￿ ation increase, followed by a decline in the
growth rate of output as the new steady state is approached.
￿ The presence of a non-linearity in the association between the policy intervention and growth
￿nds con￿rmation.
￿ The presence of both direct and indirect (on investment) impacts of policy intervention ￿nds
con￿rmation.
￿ The optimal ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP is less than 12%, and
potentially below 6%.101
￿ The optimal in￿ ation rate appears to lie below 3%.
The signi￿cance of the ￿ndings on the interaction between demand side policy and growth in
South Africa, is that they con￿rm the evidence reported in the international literature in terms of
the direct impact of government consumption expenditure on output. Government consumption
expenditure and in￿ ation are both found to have an unambiguous negative impact on long run
per capita GDP. But the results also indicate that there is an indirect impact of policy on output
via its impact on investment. Finally, the results suggest that the relationship between policy and
long run output as well as investment may be non-linear, implying the presence of an optimal
level of government consumption expenditure and in￿ ation.102 The optimal level of government
consumption expenditure is low (below 12% of GDP), as is optimal in￿ ation (below 3%).
The signi￿cance of the ￿ndings on demand side policy intervention in South Africa is that they
do play a role in the growth process. But their signi￿cance is not as a means of providing positive
demand-side stimulus to output growth. At best the positive stimulus proves very short lived, only
to be succeeded by contractionary pressures. Instead, the role of government stabilization policy
is to provide a stable and predictable macroeconomic environment ￿lowering uncertainty in the
economy, improving predictability of the economic environment for investors, while providing public
goods services.
In short there is no demand side policy panacea to the supply side problem of economic growth.
But the demand side has a role to play: to keep as stable and predictable as possible, without
distorting private sector incentives.
99The in￿ation rate is computed from the CPI.
100Estimation proceeds both in terms of Johansen vector error correction techniques, as well as threshold autore-
gressive regression techniques in the presence of non-linearity.
101Recall that government consumption expenditure is only some proportion of total expenditure. Hence the low
ratio.
102This si reconciled with the ￿nding of a negative coe¢ cient on the grounds that the estimated relationship is on
the relevantly sloped portion of the non-linear association.
358.2.7 Final Re￿ection on the Role of Institutions in Economic Growth
In the discussion thus far we have encountered the importance of institutional determinants both
of investment in physical capital stock, as well as capital ￿ ows into the South African economy.
Uncertainty arising from the nature and instability of the South African political dispensation of
the past has undoubtedly had signi￿cant impacts on the process of physical capital formation in the
South African economy, as well as its ability to attract capital in￿ ows.
An obvious extension to this line of inquiry is whether the need for a consideration of institutional
factors as determinants of long run growth prospects is not only more extensive in the sense of
requiring attention to a wider range of institutional indicators, but also more extensive in the sense
that institutional dimensions may exercise an in￿ uence on growth directly, as well as indirectly via
capital formation and capital ￿ ows.
The possibility of a link between social and political institutions and long run economic devel-
opment has long been the subject of an extensive literature in its own right. From modernization
theory 103 with its postulated positive association between economic and political development, the
emphasis on property rights as foundational to long run development in the work of North (1981,
1990) and North and Thomas (1970, 1973), the emphasis on the importance of the credibility of po-
litical dispensations,104 to the recent introduction of social capital,105 explorations of the possibility
of a link between institutions and economic development are a recurrent theme in the literature.
Theoretical forays have been accompanied by a growing body of empirical evidence.106 Finally,
within the South African context there is also the long-standing debate on whether the political
institution of apartheid proved to be growth enhancing or retarding.107
Interpretations of the evidence should be undertaken with some measure of care, however. The
theory underlying the link between institutions and economic growth is still under development, and
as a consequence interpretation of empirical speci￿cations is not without ambiguity.108 Moreover,
there is no reason to suppose that the nature of the link between institutions and output is homo-
geneous across countries.109 If so, there is considerable scope for further explorations of the link
between institutions and economic development in more detailed clinical examinations of country-
speci￿c case studies. Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001b) represents one such attempt for the case
of South Africa, exploring the role of political instability, political rights and property rights 110 in
South African growth processes in a time series context employing long runs of data. In the process
the questions outlined in the introduction to the present section of this paper are explored in greater
detail. Which institutional dimensions are important to the growth process in South Africa, and are
the channels of in￿ uence direct or indirect?
Results obtained through the econometric investigations do suggest some clear patterns of as-
sociation between the institutional and economic variables incorporated in the study. Figure 6
summarizes the ￿ndings, which are consistent with the evidence already presented on the invest-
ment function above, but also add additional nuance.111 First, note that the crucial impact of the
institutional dimensions on economic growth in South Africa appears to have been on the capital-
labour ratio. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that both political instability and property
103See for instance the classic Lipset (1959), while Diamond (1992) provides a useful overview of subsequent devel-
opments.
104See for instance Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995).
105See Coleman (1988, 1990), Putman (1995) and Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b).
106Barro (1991) is the classic reference.
107This is a tired and hackneyed old debate. For those who do need redirection, see Lipton (1985), and the collection
of readings in Leftwich (1974).
108See for instance the discussion in Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998).
109Fedderke (2001b) demonstrates not only that the steady state characteristics of growth processes are highly
sensitive to the nature of the postulated link between institutions and production, but that there is strong empirical
evidence to suggest that the link di⁄ers fundamentally between countries.
110These institutional indicators are again drawn from Fedderke, De Kadt, and Luiz (2001a).
111The reader is referred to the paper for the detailed estimation results that underlie these conclusions.
36rights are important determining factors of capital accumulation in the South African economy.
Thus the evidence suggests that it may indeed be a range of institutional dimensions that are
important for long run capital accumulation, rather than just a single isolated aspect of the institu-
tional environment. This represents a potentially important extension to the ￿ndings noted on the
investment rate noted above. In particular, we should note that the policy need identi￿ed above
of increased sensitivity to perceptions of stability surrounding the policy making process requires
further modulation.
Second, given the long-term nature of physical capital commitments, it would indeed be strange if
property rights were not of foundational importance to economic agents who can anticipate the pay-
o⁄ to their activity only some (often considerable) time in the future, often subject to considerable
risk quite apart from any ambiguity they face in ownership. Where the agent who is responsible for
setting the rules of the game that constitute the institutions in terms of which we undertake economic
activity is not seen to be fully and credibly committed to those rules which confer ownership in the
pay-o⁄ agents obtain for the risk they undertake, con￿dence and hence investment is inevitably
going to be compromised.
Third, little evidence emerges suggesting that the institutional variables impact on output directly
in addition to the indirect link via the investment rate. Instead, economic development as measured
by the level of real per capita output comes to drive institutional development both in terms of the
rights structure within the political realm, as well as in terms of the level of political instability that
prevails in South African society.
Fourth, note that the evidence favours the liberal rather than the Marxist interpretation of South
African economic history. The evidence does not support the idea that political rights supported
either capital accumulation or per capita output in any way. Instead, political institutions appear
to be an outcome variable rather than a forcing variable in the estimations. Instead, political insta-
bility and property rights appear to have precisely the e⁄ects that the liberal argument predicted:
instability generating harmful impacts, and improved property rights positive impacts on capital
accumulation.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing once again the fundamental signi￿cance of the ￿ndings reported
above and in the section on investment for the conduct of economic policy. On the basis of evidence
that has emerged both on the domestic economy and internationally, 112 there is little doubt that
the pursuit of macroeconomic stability is vital as part of growth enhancing economic policy. But
macroeconomic stability is only a part of the story, and one might argue the easy part. Far more
demanding is the need to establish that the policy commitment is a credible one, and that the
institutional framework within which it is achieved is one that will itself hold and allow economic
agents to realize the fruit of their labour.
Where institutional stability requirements are not met, we stand to lose the bene￿ts that should
accrue due to the commendable and considerable achievements that South Africa has realized
through its strict macroeconomic discipline.
9 Labour Market Ine¢ ciencies
From the opening sections of the paper we have already seen that the South African labour market
has contributed in declining measure to long term South African growth. For this reason the lack
of attention paid to the mispricing and hence resource misallocation, as well as the labour market
rigidities that characterize South African labour markets is astonishing.
The point about the importance of inappropriate pricing and rigidities in South African labour
markets is arguably one of the single most widely documented characteristics of the South African
economy to have emerged during the course of the 1990￿ s. The wage elasticity of employment has
112See the preceding discussion and Mariotti (2002) on evidence on the impact of macroeconomic policy on South
African long run economic growth.
37time and again been found to be negative in empirical study after empirical study. Supporting
descriptive evidence points in the direction of continuing rigidities creating obstacles to employment
creation. Readers who require additional evidence are referred to discussions in Lewis (2001, 2002),
Arndt and Lewis (2000), Nattrass (2000), and Fields (2000), all of whom contain references to yet
further evidence.
In this section we detail four additional pieces of evidence relevant to an understanding of the
problem of labour mispricing, and employment losses in the South African economy. First, we
examine evidence to emerge from the mining sector speci￿cally, in which employment losses are
particularly severe during the course of the 1990￿ s. Secondly, we consider evidence on the linkage
between labour productivity, the real wage and employment creation, considering both descriptive
and econometric evidence. Third, we consider some preliminary evidence on the impact of labour
skills on the wage elasticity of labour demand. Finally, we examine the impact of trade liberalization
on the demand for labour in South Africa.
9.1 The Role of the Mining Sector on Employment
Mining has traditionally constituted one of the principal employers of the South African economy.
For this reason it is instructive to consider employment trends in the mining sector ￿since it gives
some useful preliminary evidence on relevant structural features of the South African labour market
more generally. In examining this evidence, we draw extensively from the evidence presented in
Fedderke and Pirouz (2000).
We identify two salient features of the labour market in mining.
First, there has been a substantial amount of labour shedding in the mining sector during the
course of the 1990￿ s, with the employment loss concentrated in unskilled occupational categories.
This is illustrated in Figure 7, with reference to Gold & Uranium Mining, but is repeated in other
mining sectors (see Fedderke & Pirouz 2000 for additional detail). More generally, employment in
the three principal mining sectors fell from a high of 101705 employees in Coal Mining in 1985 to
55219 in 1997, for Gold & Uranium Mining the decline was from 526839 to 241352 employees over
the same period, while for Diamond & Other Mining employment declined from 199572 in 1990 to
136543 in 1997. In short, employment losses in the mining sector have been dramatic over the past
decade.
Given the signi￿cant historical contribution of mining to employment in South Africa, such
signi￿cant job losses raise immediate concerns about the reasons for such losses.
Second, a signi￿cant contributor to the employment losses in mining has been the real cost of
labour in production.113 This is readily illustrated by reference to Figures 8 through 10, which
show a substantial negative correlation between the real cost of labour114 and employment trends in
all three principal mining sectors of the South African economy, over precisely the period in which
substantial job losses have been recorded in these sectors.
The ￿nding is further con￿rmed by a consideration of the relative rate of increase in labour
productivity and the rate of increase in the real cost of labour in the mining sectors. Table 4
demonstrates that over the period in which signi￿cant job losses occurred, increases in real labour cost
consistently were greater than improvements in labour productivity ￿with the inevitable consequence
that the real unit cost of labour was increasing over the period. That job losses should occur as a
consequence is hardly surprising.
Finally, that the real cost of labour has had a signi￿cant impact on employment in mining is
further supported by more detailed multivariate econometric evidence. The ￿nding in Fedderke and
Pirouz (2002) is that the real wage elasticity for the Coal, Gold & Uranium and Diamond & Other
113Of course, this does not constrain one to assert that this is the only in￿uence.
114Note that the de￿ator employed in computing the real cost of labour is the relevant producer price index of the
sector ￿not the consumer price index, as is frequently the case in the literature. This is dictated by the relevance of
the cost of labour to the producer. See the full discussion in Fedderke & Pirouz (2002) on this point.
38Mining sectors was -0.44, -0.69, and -1.45 respectively. The evidence con￿rms that particularly in
Diamond & Other Mining (though also in Gold & Uranium) the impact of rising real costs of labour
have been potentially very severe (more than proportional), even when other contributing factors to
employment have been taken into account.
The core implication to emerge from the mining sectors of South Africa is therefore twofold. First,
employment losses have been severe, particularly in unskilled labour categories. Second, we have a
￿rst intimation of the fact that mispricing of labour is a signi￿cant contributor to the employment
losses.
Given that it is the fact that labour shedding has been the reason for the negative contribution of
labour to aggregate growth in South Africa, this gives a ￿rst indication of the possibility that labour
market ine¢ ciencies constitute an important growth constraint on the South African economy ￿
particularly during the period after 1985.
9.2 Widening the Evidence to Other Sectors of the Economy
The ￿nding that labour mispricing constitutes a signi￿cant constraint on employment creation in
South African mining, and hence acts as a brake on the economies growth performance, generalizes
to other economic sectors.
In Fedderke and Mariotti (2002) the impact of the link between the rate of increase in labour
productivity and the rate of increase in the real wage on employment creation is considered for all 48
sectors of the South African economy, again over the 1970-97 period. The ￿nding to emerge is dra-
matic: only where there is a strong positive correlation between growth in real labour remuneration
and growth in labour productivity do economic sectors in South Africa create jobs on a sustainable
basis.
We illustrate the point by reference to Figure 11. What is clear from the ￿gure is that the greater
is the congruence between growth in labour productivity and growth in real labour costs, the greater
is the positive growth rate in employment.
Noteworthy is the distinct performance of these groupings of economic sectors in terms of the
growth of employment and real labour remuneration they experienced over the full sample period.
The strength of the correlation between labour productivity and the real wage appears to be a
predictor of the strength of sustainable real wage improvements, as well as growth in employment.
With the exception of perhaps only the sector grouping with a correlation between +0.7 and
+0.8, the evidence appears to suggest the presence of a declining employment creating capacity in
sectors as they conform less closely to the dictates of standard economic theory. Where the real
wage is less closely linked to real labour productivity, the growth in employment also tends to be
lower. Moreover, the capacity for a heightened but sustained increase in real wages also appears to
be linked to the degree to which real wages are justi￿ed by labour productivity.
The immediate implication for policy intervention in South African labour markets appears
to be that "well-functioning" labour markets, de￿ned as those that link factor rewards to factor
productivity in accordance with the requisites of economic theory, appear to be more likely to
generate both employment, and sustained improvements in labour remuneration. In e⁄ect, to the
extent that by labour market ￿ exibility we mean the capacity of labour markets to adjust freely
and rapidly to the market clearing wage suggested by labour productivity, the evidence from the
link between real labour productivity and the real wage suggests that labour market ￿ exibility is
desirable.
The evidence extends further.
Considering a range of econometric evidence on real wage elasticities con￿rms the strong impact
of the cost of labour on employment prospects in the economy. For the 28 manufacturing sectors
of the South African economy, the aggregate real wage elasticity found by Fedderke and Mariotti
(2002) is in the region of -0.5 - -0.55. But in a fuller speci￿cation, which controls for demand e⁄ects,
skills composition of the labour force, openness of economic sectors, capacity utilization in sectors,
39as well as industry concentration, the wage elasticity can be found to rise to -1.97 for manufacturing
(see the extensive discussion of the estimation issues in labour markets in open economy contexts in
Fedderke, Shin and Vaze 2003).
In a more detailed examination of the impact of the skills composition of the workforce on
employment, the impact of the real cost of labour is even more dramatic. In Fedderke (2004) the
impact of the real cost of labour on employment is explored separately for highly skilled, skilled and
unskilled & semi-skilled workers for formal employment in the South African economy. The ￿nding
is consistently of negative wage elasticities for unskilled labour, with the wage elasticity for unskilled
labour in the formal labour market ranging from -2.00 to -2.23, an elasticity considerably above that
for skilled and highly skilled workers.
Given the substantial increases in the real cost of labour in the South African economy, labour
mispricing continues to o⁄er itself as a principal cause of the poor track record of job creation, and
the negative contribution of labour to long run economic development in South Africa. That the
impact of these developments have been particularly focused on the sections of the population least
well endowed with human capital, only serves to strengthen the welfare implications.
9.3 The Impact of Globalization on the South Labour Market
A ￿nal salient question in the current context is whether globalization has served to exercise a
negative in￿ uence on the South African labour market?
Providing a sound answer to this question is not technically trivial ￿and the present discussion
can only present a brief summary of the core ￿ndings of the detailed discussion in Fedderke, Shin
and Vaze (2003), which also serves to contextualize the South African evidence in terms of a wide
range of international studies.
The ￿ndings of the Fedderke, Shin and Vaze (2003) study on the 28 3-digit manufacturing sectors
in South Africa are that:
1. Globalization, or trade liberalization, has mandated positive earnings increases in sectors that
are labour intensive. This ￿nding thus con￿rms the e⁄ect on labour markets that would be
predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for South African labour markets. The ￿nding is
invariant to the methodology used, and emerges from the basic factor proportions approach,
the Leamer (1998) mandated wage regression approach, as well as the approach of Feenstra and
Hanson (1999) and Haskel and Slaughter (2001) which allows for endogeneity of the technology
of production.
2. The implication is thus clear: trade liberalization and globalization has not hurt labour in
South Africa. On the contrary, it has increased demand for, and the earnings of labour. This
￿nding is invariant to the methodology used to test for trade e⁄ects.
3. By contrast to demand-side e⁄ects, technology has mandated negative increases in labour
earnings. Technological change in South African labour markets has thus been labour saving.
4. The net e⁄ect of the combined demand-side (globalization) and technology e⁄ects is such as to
raise questions about the magnitude of actual real wage increases in the South African labour
markets, once again emerge as a potential source of poor employment creation.
The evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on the South African labour markets thus
suggests that the impact of globalization has been such as to expand rather than contract the demand
for labour, and labour earnings. On the other hand technological change has been substantially
labour-saving. Given the net e⁄ect of these two countervailing forces, actual earnings changes
have been of an order of magnitude that is di¢ cult to justify, and may serve to explain the poor
employment creation capacity of the South African labour markets.
409.4 Summarizing the Labour Market Evidence
The ￿ndings on South African labour markets are straightforward to summarize.
First, wage elasticities of labour demand are persistently negative in the South African economy,
and they are strongly negative. This points to the importance of rising costs of labour as a reason
for the poor employment performance of the economy. This is particularly so for a number of labour
intensive sectors of the economy, and for unskilled labour, for which the wage elasticity may exceed
-2.00. To ￿nd the culprit for the poor contribution of labour to South African output growth is thus
not di¢ cult. Wage moderation has been insu¢ ciently practiced.
Second, since technology has been labour saving in the South African labour market, the need
for wage moderation is even more marked.
Finally, the evidence does not support the notion that trade liberalization has been responsible
for labour shedding in South Africa￿ s manufacturing sector.
10 Innovation, Human Capital, and their Relevance to the
South African Context
Modern growth theory has come to place increased emphasis on innovation as a long-term driver of
economic growth, with explicit attention focusing on the source of technological innovation in the
economy. As we saw in an examination of a growth accounting exercise for South Africa earlier in
this paper, such a focus is not inappropriate for the South African context ￿the contribution of
growth in total factor productivity has been rising in South Africa.
What is common to many approaches to endogenous growth theory is the presumption that
innovation is the outcome of an explicit devotion of resources to technological advance. Where
contributions di⁄er is in their identi￿cation of the nature and impact of such resources. For Romer
(1986)-type models the source of innovation is spill-overs attaching to investment in physical capital
stock. For the Lucas (1988)-variant the spill-overs can be argued to emanate from investment in
human rather than physical capital stock. Finally, in variants of the Schumpeterian approach to
long run growth, innovation is the explicit outcome of the devotion of resources to technical advance,
rather than the production of ￿nal output.115
The crucial question for our purposes must ￿rst be whether endogenous growth processes are
present in South Africa, and secondly what form such endogenous growth processes might take.
The latter is crucial given the divergent policy implications that the alternative conceptions carry.
Fedderke (2001g) addresses this set of questions econometrically.116
The core question in estimation is whether we can isolate the core determinants of the growth
in total factor productivity that we saw in an earlier section to be an increasing contributor to
aggregate South African economic growth.
Since the results are symmetrical, we focus discussion on the results for the spill-over speci￿cation
in Table 5, though the additional modulations to emerge from the Schumpeterian ￿ndings are also
touched upon. More detailed discussion of these results, including the Schumpeterian case can be
found in Fedderke (2001g).
115For a non-technical discussion of the generic approaches to endogenous growth theory, and their implications for
economic as well as institutional development, see Fedderke (2002c).
116The methodology applies dynamic heterogeneous panel analysis to the South African manufacturing sectors.
















growth in physical capital stock (for the Romer (1986) type of approach), growth in human capital (for the Lucas
(1988) type of approach), or growth in intermediate inputs or quality ladders (under Romer (1990) or Grossman and
Helpman (1992) type approaches), and Zi denotes a range of additional regressors suggested by the literature. Here
we skip the relatively complex range of estimation issues that arise, and proceed to salient estimation results directly.
Full discussion of the estimation issues can be found in Fedderke (2001g).
41While the results con￿rm the presence of spill-over e⁄ects for South African manufacturing, it
is important to note that the con￿rmation is not unconditional. In the ￿rst instance we should
note that to the extent that spill-over e⁄ects are corroborated, they take the form suggested by
Lucas (1988) rather than Romer (1986). The coe¢ cient on the growth rate of the capital stock is
consistently negative (even where we control for investment in human as well as physical capital) and
statistically signi￿cant. Since the coe¢ cient of the capital growth rate should control for the positive
contribution of capital stock over and above that implied by its income share due to spill-overs, this
constitutes a rejection of Romer-type spill-over e⁄ects in South African manufacturing industry.
On the other hand, Lucas-type spill-over e⁄ects do ￿nd some support, in the sense that at least
some of the human capital investment variables prove to have positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients.
However, even here the support for Lucas spill-overs is circumscribed. In particular, only very
speci￿c types of investment in human capital contribute positively to productivity growth. The
proportion of matriculation students sitting mathematics, and the proportion of degrees in the
natural, engireering and mathematical sciences (NES) in total degrees are the only two human
capital variables that provide a positive and signi￿cant contribution to productivity growth in South
African manufacturing industry over the 1970-97 period.
By contrast, the total school enrollment rate, and the total number of degrees issued by South
African universities, while signi￿cant, contributed negatively to total factor productivity growth,
while the white school enrollment rate, the total number of NES degrees, and the number of ap-
prenticeship contracts per capita prove to be insigni￿cant.
What counts for purposes of the innovative activity that is coupled to long run output growth
in South African manufacturing, is not so much the production of human capital per se but the
production of quality human capital, as proxied by the math and NES degree proportions. And
there are at least two good reasons that make this ￿nding plausible. The ￿rst is that quality human
capital is simply more likely to have the positive spill-over e⁄ects identi￿ed by Lucas (1988), while
poor quality human capital does not. A second interpretation of the evidence might point to an
improved quality of screening by an educational system (both primary and secondary, and tertiary)
with rising math and NES degree proportions. This is turn would reduce the risk faced by producers
wishing to hire human capital for purposes of innovative activity.
The results of estimations testing the Schumpeterian hypothesis con￿rm the presence of a positive
impact of R&D expenditure on growth in total factor productivity, as postulated by Schumpeterian
theory. Thus the ￿ndings con￿rm the presence of the positive impact on output growth of innovative
R&D activity undertaken by the private sector. Results from the range of human capital indicators
again point to the possibility of a positive impact of human capital spill-overs on productivity growth.
However, just as for the spill-over results, the particular dimension of human capital investment
controlled for proves to be crucial. The positive impact on productivity growth emerges from the
NES degree proportion variable (as it did for the spill-over discussion), while a number of human
capital variables prove to be negative and signi￿cant (WENROL, APPCAP) or insigni￿cant. The
interpretation of this evidence remains much the same as for the spill-over results above. While
the human capital dimension can legitimately be argued to have a positive impact on long run
productivity growth, it is above all the quality dimension of human capital that exercises this e⁄ect
rather than the quantity of human capital.
The empirical evidence from South African manufacturing industry thus appears to point to a
positive impact from both explicit R&D activity, as well as the human capital dimension, particularly
the quality dimension of the latter.
The implication is that we can isolate the core determinants of growth in total factor productiv-
ity for South Africa. They are investment in quality human capital, as proxied by the proportion
of school leavers and university graduates engaged in mathematical, scienti￿c and engineering dis-
ciplines, and R&D development activity. Given this evidence, it is not di¢ cult to understand why
the South African economy has not realized a stronger growth performance led by growth in total
factor productivity.
42In Figures 12 and 13 we report the proportion of white and black matriculants sitting mathematics
(in any of the three grades available) and the proportion of university graduates by race in the NES
degree categories. Table 4 reports the per academic sta⁄ research output by university over the
1989-94 period.
The implication of the evidence is clear. In all three indicators of the underlying capacity of
the South African economy to undertake long term innovation we have seen substantial decline.
The proportion of matriculants in the historically ￿best￿ parts of the schooling system has been
in steady decline ￿and in black schooling has been persistently low. Little wonder therefore that
the proportion of NES degrees has collapsed. R&D activity in the university system in turn has
also shown a steady decline on a per capita basis. Even the best part of the university system in
South Africa has at the very least manifested declining quality over time. First, the white university
research output has ceased to increase in absolute terms from the late 1980￿ s, and in per lecturer
output terms the output declined through to the early 1990￿ s, though it has since stabilized. Also,
most research in South Africa is done in a very small number of universities.
The story of South African education has consistently been one of widening access,117 but at the
expense of the system￿ s capacity to deliver on what matters most for long run economic development
purposes: sound education in mathematics and science, and a deepening research capacity within
the system.
We noted at the outset that econometric evidence on South Africa establishes that there exists
a growth impact that attaches to investment in human capital. What was also evident from the
evidence was that the growth impact attaches to investment in quality human capital rather than
human capital in general.
What emerges from the rest of the discussion in this section is that the educational system in
South Africa has placed full weight on widening access, and very little emphasis on improving the
quality of the training that it provides. Regardless of whether we are talking of the schooling or the
university system in South Africa, even the supposedly ￿best￿part of the system performs relatively
poorly in generating the sorts of output that come to count in the long run economic development
stakes.
Historically, therefore, the educational systems design in South Africa has not been optimally
geared as part of the South African economic developmental challenges. Indeed, the evidence sug-
gests that not only was the output of the educational system poorly suited to growth needs, but
the means of achieving what output there was, in the case of the university system at least proved
to be expensive both in direct resource requirements as well as in at least some implied foregone
opportunities for improvement in what excellence there was in the university system.
11 Conclusion
The analysis has identi￿ed the sources of economic growth in South Africa against the backdrop
of international economic developments. Between 1870 and 1914, the international regime was
one of free capital ￿ ows ￿both direct and portfolio ￿and free trade. This allowed the diamond
and gold industries to establish themselves, the latter requiring and receiving large direct capital
in￿ ows. Exports of agricultural goods were also facilitated by a free trade regime. Investment in
infrastructure was also substantial. The costliest adverse factors were those which led to the South
African war of 1899-1902. While the post-1902 political con￿guration was more supportive of growth
than its predecessor, the war left a legacy of substantial public debt and political bitterness.
In common with many others, the South African economy ￿ oundered between 1914 and 1932
with a spell of prosperity between 1922 and 1928. War-time in￿ ation, post-war dislocation, the
return to the gold standard and the great depression all had adverse impacts. Nonetheless, the gold
117We lack the space to be able to develop evidence of the widening access here. But see Fedderke, De Kadt and
Luiz (2000, 2003) for full details.
43mining industry navigated its way through di¢ cult times and manufacturing developed throughout
the period, aided by natural geographic protection as well as protective tari⁄s. Manufacturing
sectors grew in di⁄erent ways: many as the result of increased capital and labour inputs, but some
as a result of technological progress. South Africa￿ s experience di⁄ered from those of its European
suppliers of capital and trading partners after 1933, partly because of its status as a supplier of gold
and partly because its political stability did not deteriorate in the way that European stability did.
After 1945, savings and investment rates rose. The predominant source of growth within man-
ufacturing was capital-intensi￿cation, evidence of which can be found in agriculture as well. South
Africa￿ s balance of payments problems could be dealt with within the Bretton Woods framework;
even the capital controls imposed after Sharpeville were not that remarkable under an international
economic regime which regarded them as a legitimate instrument for use in times of balance of
payments di¢ culties. In the changed international economic environment which took place in the
late 1970s, however, the persistence of capital controls functioned as a greater constraint on foreign
investment.
It is in the most recent period ￿since 1970 ￿that the engines of growth in South Africa have
come under greatest stress. The most obvious problem was serious political instability after 1976
which, it has been argued, undermined both the propensity to invest and the in￿ ows of foreign
capital necessary to ￿nance such investment, since South Africa has generally been a net importer
of capital. But there were other reasons as well. Although technological progress came to account
increasingly for economic growth from the 1970s, it did so to a considerable extent by default, with
the contribution of both capital and labour growth declining. There is clear evidence of labour
market rigidities by the end of the period.
There have been limits on technological progress. The evidence suggests that South African
technological progress has been of the Lucas and/or Schumpeterian rather than the Romer type.
That is, it derives from investment in human capital rather than physical capital. Moreover, it
derives from human capital investments of a speci￿c type - in mathematics, science and engineering
￿which the South African educational system ￿nds most di¢ cult to produce.
Two factors positive for growth should be noted. Financial deepening has had a positive in￿ uence
on growth, though credit rationing has remained a constraint up to the end of the twentieth century.
South African growth has been well served by relatively conservative monetary and ￿scal policy.
There have been deviations in the form of high in￿ ation between the late 1970s and the early 1990s
and the large budget de￿cits of the last apartheid years. But it has been recognised each time ￿
also by post-apartheid governments ￿that these deviations are undesirable and policies have been
introduced to rectify them.
How did segregation and apartheid a⁄ect economic growth? Segregation, like all systems of
discrimination, imposed static e¢ ciency costs on the economy. These costs varied with government
policies. The Botha and ￿rst Smuts administration imposed lighter costs than the PACT govern-
ment of 1924-1929 or the Nationalist government of 1929-1933. The PACT government saw the
introduction of the civilised labour policy and higher rates of protection. It and the two successive
governments increased aid to agriculture. But none of this seriously undermined a respectable rate
of growth from 1922 to1928 or the more rapid rate from 1933 to 1945.
The e¢ ciency costs imposed after 1948 were heavier and they stored up trouble for later growth.
The central elements of apartheid ￿complete urban segregation, tightly controlled and poorly funded
education for Africans, much more rigorous in￿ ux control, rural resettlement to homelands, controls
on African ownership outside the homelands ￿amounted to a massive attempt at social engineering.
Political resistance to the programme was contained between 1948 and 1960 and then repressed more
strongly during the 1960s. The determinants of growth most strongly a⁄ected by these developments
were human capital, property rights and an increasing international isolation of South Africa, leading
ultimately to adverse impacts on capital in￿ ows. Political instability in South Africa became overt
in the period 1976-1994, the period over which real per capital income dropped substantially.
Overt political instability within South Africa has been dramatically reduced since 1994. But
44South Africa su⁄ers as a destination for investment from its situation in a rough neighbourhood and
from intractable social problems: high unemployment and HIV/AIDS being just two of the most
salient of them. And since, as Samuel Huntington points out, democracies are not consolidated until
there have been two alternations in power, internal stability is not yet permanently guaranteed.
Property rights are guaranteed in the 1996 Constitution, but they can be trumped by expropriation
carried out in the public interest, which can include land reform. Proposals for using the ￿nancial
system to achieve pre-determined ownership goals may not always be compatible with ￿nancial mar-
ket e¢ ciency. The South African educational system ￿particularly its schools ￿has to demonstrate
that, in addition to producing commitment to democratic values (desirable in themselves), it can
turn out hard skills indispensable to growth. It is around these themes that the growth performance
of the South African economy in the coming decades will be discussed.
12 Appendix
12.1 The Systemic Uncertainty or Political Instability Index
A measure of systemic uncertainty is provided by an index of political instability obtained from
Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001). It is illustrated in Figure 1. Political instability was latent in
South Africa throughout the twentieth century, and became overt often after 1948. The index is a
weighted average of eleven indicators of repressive state responses to pressures for political reform.
They are constructed from o¢ cial and uno¢ cial sources,
The indicators are:
￿ the number of prosecutions under the Defence Acts, and Emergency regulations;
￿ the number of prosecutions for ￿faction ￿ghting￿ ;
￿ the number of people proscribed and/or banned under the Suppression of Communism Act
1950;
￿ the number of people placed in detention;
￿ the number of political fatalities;
￿ the number of organizations o¢ cially banned;
￿ the number of actions against ￿riots￿ ;
￿ declarations of o¢ cial states of emergency;
￿ the number of publications subjected to censorship.
Weightings were determined by the Delphi technique on the basis of advice from leading political
scientists in South Africa.118
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Figure 1: Real Per Capita GDP and the associated growth rate. 

















































































































   
Figure 2: Decomposition of growth in real GDP into the contribution of factors 
































Figure 3: Private Savings
1 and Investment Rates
2: South Africa, 1970-2000.  








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































K Rate of Return denotes the proxy for the expected rate of return on capital 
Marginal Cost the user cost of capital 
Sect. Uncert. a measure of sectoral demand uncertainty 
Syst. Uncert. a measure of systemic uncertainty.
3  
Figures are standard deviations, denoting the standard deviation response in the investment rate to a 
one standard deviation change in the independent variable. All coefficients statistically significant.  
                                                           
1 Defined as the sum of corporate saving (Unit: R millions, current prices (Period)) [Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (S-129)] 
and saving by households (Unit: R millions, current prices (Period)) [Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (S-131)], as a proportion 
of gross national product at factor cost (Unit: R millions, current prices (Period)) [Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (S-127)]. 
2 Defined as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation at current prices by private business enterprises (Unit: R millions, current 
prices (Period)) [Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (S-116)] to gross national product at factor cost (Unit: R millions, current 
prices (Period)) [Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletin (S-127)]. 
3 For the systemic uncertainty measure we employ the data set contained in Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001a). For the precise 
definition of the other variables deployed, the reader is referred to the discussion in Fedderke (2001a). 
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Source: adapted from Fedderke (2001a). 
 







































Notes:  Int diff denotes the change in the exchange rate adjusted interest differential, defined as the 
difference between the foreign and the domestic interest rate.
4  
Growth denotes the percentage change in gross domestic product.  
Change in Rights is defined as the change in an index of political rights.
5   
Uncertainty refers to the index of political instability employed in the investment estimations reported 
in Figure 3.  
Change in overvaluation is defined as the change in the degree of over/undervaluation of the exchange 
rate in terms of PPP.  
Figures are standard deviations, denoting the standard deviation response in the investment rate to a 
one standard deviation change in the independent variable. All coefficients are statistically significant.  
 





















                                                           
4 Thus a positive Int diff should trigger capital outflows. 
5 See Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001a) for a detailed description of the index underlying this 
variable. 
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Figure 6: Patterns of Association. 
 















































































































































































































































































































Industry 1946  1970  1994 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  6 469     
(7.2%) 




Mining and quarrying  14 554     
(16.3%) 




Manufacturing  9 670     
(10.8%) 




Electricity, gas and water  858     
(1.0%) 




Construction  2 844     
(3.2%) 




Wholesale and retail trade, catering and 
accommodation 
10 062     
(11.2%) 




Transport, storage and communication  6 096     
(6.8%) 




Financial intermediation, insurance, real 
estate and business services 
13 371     
(14.9%) 




General government services  18 255     
(20.4%) 




Community, social and other personal 
services 
7 351     
(8.2%) 








Gross value added at basic prices  89 530  280 217  485 782 




Table 2: Sources of manufacturing growth between 1920 and 1945. 
 
 









Rubber & Plastics (1920-4, 
1934-9) 
Basic Metal Industries 
(1920-4, 1940-5) 




Motor Transport (1920-24) 
Wearing Apparel 
Wood (1930’s) 


























Motor Transport (1930-45) 
 







60Table 3: Sources of manufacturing growth between 1945 and 1969 
 









Printing & Publishing 
Leather 
Rubber & Plastics 
Chemicals 
Non-metallic Minerals 








































Table 4: Comparison of Average Percentage changes in Labour Productivity and Real 
Labour Cost in the Three Aggregate Mining Sectors of South Africa. 
 
Sector: Avg  % 
Change in: 
1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-97 
Coal Labour 
Productivity 
3.19 7.95  11.27  -1.39  4.02 5.96 
  Real Cost of 
Labour 





-4.47 -4.61 -4.31 -1.22  6.09  -1.28 
  Real Cost of 
Labour 





2.40 0.58 5.64 1.19 5.11 8.58 
  Real Cost of 
Labour 
6.61 -4.88  14.70 3.98  2.17 15.58 
 

















61Table 5: Testing for Spill-Over Effects 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity 








R&D  0.02* 
(.01) 
WENROL  -0.03 
(0.34) 
WENROL  -0.67* 
(0.30) 
TOTENROL  -0.12* 
(0.04) 
 
TOTENROL  -0.09 
(0.05) 
MATHPRP  0.11* 
(0.04) 
MATHPRP  0.02 
(0.04) 
 








NESDEG  0.00 
(0.00) 




NESDEGPRP  0.79* 
(0.32) 
NESDEGPRP  1.00* 
(0.39) 
APPCAP  13.82 
(15.13) 
APPCAP  -50.75* 
(19.52) 
LnPATENT  0.01* 
(0.004) 
LnPATENT  0.02* 
(0.00) 
 
Figures in round parentheses denote standard errors, * denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
level. 
WENROL denotes the primary and secondary school enrolment rate for “whites”, TOTENROL the 
primary and secondary school enrolment rate for all population groups, MATHPRP the proportion of 
matriculants sitting mathematics, DEGREE the total number of degrees issued by universities, 
NESDEG the number of degrees issued in the natural, engineering and mathematical sciences 
(NES), NESDEGPRP the proportion of NES degrees issued, APPCAP the per capita apprenticeship 
contracts issued, PATENT the number of patents registered, and R&D denotes an indicator of 





























































































































Source: Fedderke and Pirouz (2002). 
 
 
Figure 11: Exploring the link between wage increases moderated to the rate of 
productivity increase, and employment growth 
 
 











The Systemic Uncertainty or Political Instability Index 
 
A measure of systemic uncertainty is provided by an index of political instability 
obtained from Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001).  It is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Political instability was latent in South Africa throughout the twentieth century, and 
became overt often after 1948.  The index is a weighted average of eleven indicators  
of repressive state responses to pressures for political reform. They are constructed 
from official and unofficial sources, 
 
The indicators are: 
 
•  the number of prosecutions under the Defence Acts, and Emergency 
regulations;  
•  the number of prosecutions for “faction fighting”;  
•  the number of people proscribed and/or banned under the Suppression of 
Communism Act 1950;  
•  the number of people placed in detention;  
•  the number of political fatalities;  
•  the number of organizations officially banned;  
•  the number of actions against “riots”;  
•  declarations of official states of emergency;  
•  the number of publications subjected to censorship.  
 
Weightings were determined by the Delphi technique on the basis of advice from 






















                                                           
6 See the detailed discussion in Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001). 
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Political Instability 
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